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“Tell me, where is your mother, Michael? Have you ever seen her terrified? No child should see this. It is
the end of childhood, when you see your mother’s face slacken, her eyes dead. When she is defeated by
simply seeing the threat approaching. When she does not believe she can save you.
—This is the end, my mother said. —They mean to kill us all.
Achak, I am so sorry. But we will not make it through this day.”
What is the what
Eggers [2006, p. 85–86]
. . . to all achaks.

aan lune en wiebe,
droommeisje.
aan dirk.
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PREFACE
At the outset of my doctoral research, I intended to study the causes of what I then
believed was a particular class of conflicts: so-called ethnic conflicts. Very quickly, how-
ever, I found myself analysing conflicts in a Third World setting, with a focus on some
plausible microeconomic mechanisms that underlie those conflicts. All along, I sensed
that I could not grasp the distinguishing characteristics of ethnic conflicts. In Chapter
1, I explain why I believe to have been right in focusing on the economic, rather than
the ethnic character of a considerable share of today’s conflicts. The subsequent chapters
deal with microeconomic foundations of civil conflict.
In Chapters 2 and 3, with Dirk Van de gaer, we study political areas in which two
– ostensibly distinguishable – groups determine whether or not to cooperate with the
other group. Although it is a standard set-up in the literature, it entails two nontriv-
ial assumptions: first, it assumes that a country is populated by exactly two groups,
and second, it assumes that groups manage to overcome the within-group coordination
and free-riding problems. The principal motive for these simplifying assumptions is not
particularly high-minded: multiple-player games are just not as tractable as two-player
games. Fortunately, however, the assumptions can also be rationalised on more hon-
ourable grounds. Needless to say that conflicts may involve more than two parties. But
from Collier and Hoeffler [2004] we know that especially ethnic dominance – where a
dominant ethnic group (with a small majority) faces an ethnic minority (whether or not
a coalition of ethnic groups) – makes countries conflict-prone. To study the mechanisms
underlying such cases, a two-player set-up is probably not inadequate. Moreover, ex-
tensive conflict research shows that a sizeable share of contemporary communally based
conflicts is indeed fought between two groups (Gurr [1994]). That groups manage to
overcome the free-riding and coordination problem, may seem an even stronger assump-
tion. There is, however, considerable support in the literature, especially in the context
of ethnic groups, in favour of successful within-group coordination: sufficient levels of
social control within ethnic groups and strong ethnic norms, supported by coercion, can
unify a group’s actions (see, among others, Roemer [1985]; Robinson [2001]; Gates [2002];
Bhavnani [2006]).
A more fundamental critique on considering two immutable groups, I believe, fol-
lows from the discussion on ethnicity in Chapter 1, from which we know that ethnic
group boundaries are permeable and mutable. Therefore, in Chapter 4, with Thomas
Demuynck, we endogenise the number and size of the contending groups and, thus,
allow for groups to be formed – whether or not ethnically – for joint rent seeking.
Chapter 1. ‘Ethnic, a deceptive label’ contains a conceptual discussion on the (academic)
use of ethnic as a discriminating label of civil conflicts. Whether it is by facilitating the
provision of public goods, or by motivating for the participation in life-threatening civil
wars, the economic and political salience of ethnicity lies in its potential to mobilise for
collective action. In a conflict where ethnicity matters, therefore, it need not necessarily
be the ‘engine that powers the conflict.’ It may just as well serve merely as a binding
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4and mobilising device in the pursuit of a group’s common goals. Therefore, I argue that
‘ethnic’ is not accurate enough as a distinguishing label in the context of civil conflict.
Moreover, considering this conceptual flaw, I also advocate against the academic use of
‘ethnic conflict’ from a normative perspective. Without overstating its importance, I be-
lieve that by reifying the belief in a common ethnic history – thus fostering the cultivation
or even creation of common myths – and considering the pejorative connotation (West-
ern) public opinion attaches to an ethnically labelled conflict,1 such academic labelling
entails potential misuse by both local and international policy makers. Therefore, I argue
for a disambiguation of the concept. It would, for example, be both helpful and desirable
to distinguish between an instrumental ethnic conflict and a primordial ethnic conflict.
Chapter 2. In ‘Natural resources and civil conflict’ we study how the economic struc-
ture of a country may affect strategic interaction between its inhabitants. As discussed
above, we consider two identifiable groups who choose whether or not to cooperate with
members of the other group. The key contribution of this chapter is that we propose a
categorisation of economies based on the degree to which conflict and segregation harm
their productivity, and we demonstrate its usefulness in explaining conflict. By elimi-
nating dominated strategies, and assuming exogenous beliefs in the trustworthiness of
the other group, we show that especially economies that heavily depend on the robust2
resource extraction sectors are conflict-prone. Furthermore, we show that the manipula-
tion of trust is most effective in subsistence and plantation economies and that especially
the latter will be prone to segregation.
Chapter 3. In ‘How to prevent conflict’ we build on the model of Chapter 2 to study the
effectiveness and predictability of four – external – policy tools to prevent conflict. We
consider two types of boycotts, the manipulation of the balance of power and confidence
building. Here too, we assume the societal costs of conflict and segregation to depend
on the type of economic activity the country mainly depends on. Groups are assumed to
be imperfectly informed on the cooperativeness of the other group. We study whether
foreign intervention can induce Bayesian Nash equilibria, where both groups choose to
cooperate and whether it can prevent equilibria where both choose to fight, and how
easy it is to predict the effects of such external intervention. We show that a boycott that
materialises as soon as one of the parties chooses not to cooperate is the only instru-
ment that is unconditionally effective. Besides entailing moral issues of having to choose
sides, both trust building and power politics are less effective. Moreover, although it is
currently the most acclaimed policy instrument by e.g. the United Nations, the outcomes
of trust building can be highly unpredictable.
Chapter 4. In ‘International commodity prices’ we focus on a specific labour market sit-
uation, endemic to underdeveloped rural sub-Saharan Africa. We consider an economy
1Ethnic conflict is popularly viewed as the inevitable consequence of irrational, innate ethnic loathing,
as tribal and ancient-old hatred
2Robust resources encompass two established concepts in the literature: the highly concentrated and
easily controlled point resources (like oil or kimberlite diamonds) and inexpensively harvested and easily
smuggled lootable resources (like coltan or alluvial diamonds). See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion
on robust resources.
5with an agricultural sector that produces an internationally traded and priced tropical
good (coffee or cocoa, for instance), a mining sector with monopolistic profits and a
rebel sector that preys on the mining sector. Conflict only emerges if the mining sector
generates enough excess profits for at least two rebel groups to be viable. Therefore, as
stated above, the number of competing rebel groups is endogenously determined. First,
we show that not only the price of mineral resources matters. Prices of internationally
traded and priced tropical agricultural commodities matter just as much: a drop in those
prices increases the attractiveness of other ‘economic’ activities such as rebellion or war-
fare and can, therefore, trigger civil conflict. Furthermore, we show that civil war carries
a non-reversible component within it: by damaging agricultural productivity, it lowers
market wages and, therefore, increases the profits in the mining sector. These higher
profits in the mining sector, in turn, lower the threshold mineral prices above which
conflict becomes lucrative for more than one rebel group.
General conclusion
“The purpose of studying civil conflict is of course to identify its causes. Ultimately,
a better understanding of the circumstances that are conducive to civil conflict should
enable governments and the international community to prevent it from erupting or at
least to prevent it from reoccurring.” (Chapter 1, first sentences.) Ideally, therefore, this
study contributes to a better understanding of Civil conflict and its causes. It should be
acknowledged that the following general conclusions, which I draw from my doctoral
research, go considerably beyond the much narrower conclusions which economic mod-
elling typically allows for. I am confident, however, that, if handled cautiously, they
remain pertinent from a policy point of view.
It is beyond doubt that ethnicity matters in many contemporary civil conflicts and
that it may affect group behaviour and interaction through several fundamentally dis-
tinct channels. Remarkably, however, there is very little (if any) empirical or theoretical
substantiation of the view most widely held among – notably Western – policy makers,
reporters and the general public, viz. that ethnic conflicts are driven by irrational, tribal or
ancient old hatreds. We argue that the discrepancy between the academic concept and its
popular perception may entail local and international political opportunism. In addition,
by failing to discriminate between the various types of civil conflicts where contending
groups have aligned ethnically, ‘ethnic conflict’ is also totally ineffectual as an analytic
concept. The conceptual discussion in Chapter 1 therefore calls on the academic world
to distinguish between different types of ethnic conflicts.
Although the subsequent chapters deal with civil conflict from a microeconomic
perspective, each chapter implicitly also comprises some aspect of (ethnic) mobilisa-
tion. For example, when considering optimising behaviour at group level, especially
when groups antagonise, one considers ‘representative’ group members and assumes
that the groups have managed to overcome the problems of coordination and free-
riding. In a more general interpretation, therefore, Chapters 2 and 4 establish the
economic prerequisites for deliberate (ethnic) mobilisation by some political elite to be
successful and lucrative. Predatory elites are expected to be particularly prevalent in
robust resource-dependent economies, while especially poor and tropical agricultural
6commodity-dependent economies appear vulnerable the cultivation of (ethnic) distrust.
Chapter 3, in turn, examines the tools which the international community has at its dis-
posal to prevent an area from polarising (ethnically). Against the current international
bias in favour of ‘soft’ intervention policies like confidence building, a credible threat of
an economic boycott appears to be more effective.
Obviously, in a model where political entrepreneurs can instigate conflict strategies,
a credible boycott discounts their potential gains from (ethnically) mobilising part of the
population to their own benefit. Essentially, what Collier [2007, p. 149] advocates with
‘a charter for budget transparency’ would have a comparable effect: whether they are
imposed by the international community (boycott) or institutionalised by national con-
sensus or law (charter), to prevent groups from (violently) polarising in their attempt to
further private or groups’ goals, there is a need for stringent mechanisms that discourage
or inhibit embezzlement, appropriation or a skewed allocation of public resources.
Finally, from Chapters 2 and 4 we know that excessive dependence on either robust
resources or tropical agricultural commodities makes countries (especially ethnically di-
verse ones) utterly susceptible to civil conflict. Therefore, to safeguard countries from
civil conflict, this dissertation unambiguously argues in favour of a structural diversifi-
cation of the economic activity.
Although fostering economic diversification undoubtedly belongs to the core respon-
sibilities of local authorities, there are disquieting reasons why the international commu-
nity too should feel concerned. First, however well-intentioned, it is conceivable that the
Fair Trade movement’s stimuli to the production of, e.g., coffee or cocoa, exacerbate Third
World countries’ dependence on tropical agricultural commodities and, thus, contribute
to their proneness to conflict. Moreover, combined, First World export subsidies and the
system of tariff escalation increase primary commodity dependence and inhibit the de-
velopment of a secondary industry in the Third World. More fundamentally, therefore,
First World agricultural policy undeniably produces a fertile ground for civil conflict in
the Third World and, thus, imposes a highly underestimated cost on its resource-rich,
but tropical agricultural commodity-dependent, countries.
1ETHNIC , A DECEPT IVE LABEL
“Herein lies the attractiveness of ethnic agitation: its ease and accessibility.
The Other is visible, everyone can regonize and remember his image.
One doesn’t have to read books, think, discuss: it is enough just to look.”
The Shadow of the Sun
Kapus´cin´ksi [2001, p. 86]
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of studying civil conflict is of course to identify its causes. Ultimately,
a better understanding of the circumstances that are conducive to civil conflict should
enable governments and the international community to prevent it from erupting or at
least to prevent it from reoccurring. A recent example of international involvement in
the Great Lakes region shows how an incorrect assessment, a misunderstanding of the
drivers of a conflict, can have devastating consequences. Devoid of any moral or critical
judgement (I am aware of the hindsight bias), it seems fair to say that World Bank and
IMF pressure for economic and political reforms on the Hutu regime in the early 1990s
(in favour of more – notably Tutsi – political rights) contributed to the rise in popularity
of the extremist Hutu factions and to the extreme politicisation of ethnic identity in
Rwanda.
The focus of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that ethnic may not always be a
suitable discriminating label for internal conflicts: mostly, it lacks the necessary accuracy
to point to a distinguishing characteristic of the conflict. Then, given the potential mis-
use such labelling may entail, I question whether using ethnic as a discriminating label
in academic research is advisable. Therefore, I advocate disambiguation: it would be
both helpful and desirable to distinguish between, for example, an ‘instrumental ethnic
conflict’ and a ‘primordial ethnic conflict.’
In Section 1.2, I briefly review the literature on the role of ethnicity in economic de-
velopment. From this literature, it should be clear that ethnicity influences economic
advancement through its potential to mobilise for collective action. In Section 1.3, there-
fore, after defining the core concepts of this paper (ethnic identity and ethnic conflict), I
review the dominant theories on the potential mechanisms through which ethnic iden-
tification, polarisation and politicisation may occur. After this review, in Section 1.4, I
elaborate on the problematic nature of ethnicity as a characterising concept of civil con-
flicts. In Section 1.5, a short narrative of the recent history of Rwanda and the build-up
towards the 1994 genocide serve as a tragic illustration of the preceding discussion. Fi-
nally, in Section 1.6, I summarise my principal arguments against the prevailing use of
ethnic as an academic label for internal conflicts.
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1.2 The role of ethnicity in economic development
In a seminal paper, Easterly and Levine [1997] show that ethnically diverse countries
grow significantly slower. Subsequent empirical research quite robustly confirms that
the ethnic composition of a country matters to its economic development. Theoretically,
there appear to be two plausible channels through which ethnic diversity might indeed
hamper economic development.
Easterly and Levine find a strong and robust empirical link between ethnic diversity
and public policy choices: heterogeneous societies find it difficult to agree on growth
enhancing policies and on the provision of (certain) public goods. Among many others,
Alesina et al. [1999] come to similar conclusions: ethnic diversity hampers effective col-
lective action and (political) cooperation. Collier and Gunning [1999]; Collier [2000] and
Alesina and La Ferrara [2005] too, in their respective review papers, find evidence for
the negative effect of ethnic diversity or fragmentation on the provision of public goods,
but their results are conditional: rich countries with full democratic rights seem to find
ways to overcome the ‘diversity-handicap.’
The second channel is more of interest to the current analysis: to the extent that
ethnic diversity increases the risk for civil conflict, the ethnic composition of a country
influences its economic development. Extensive literature, pioneered by Collier and Ho-
effler [1998, 2004], examines the potential link between ethnic divisions and civil conflict.
Collier and Hoeffler find a non-monotonic relation between the degree of ethnic diver-
sity and civil conflict, where both highly fractionalised and homogeneous societies are
on the safe side, and ethnic dominance makes society conflict-prone. Fearon and Laitin
[2003], on the other hand, argue that after controlling for per capita income, the alleged
significant relation between ethnic diversity and civil violence disappears. Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol [2005a,b], however, claim that the weak empirical support for the link
between ethnicity and conflict is due to measurement errors: instead of focusing on po-
larisation, most empirical studies have used an index that measures fractionalisation. In
sum, again, there appears to be substantial evidence for a conditional impact of ethnicity
on civil conflict.
Irrespective of which channel would be the most relevant one, it is obvious that it is its
potential to mobilise for collective action – be it contributing to the provision of a public
good or participating in a life-threatening civil war – that makes ethnicity a politically
and economically salient phenomenon. Instead of dealing with the consequences of
ethnic diversity, therefore, the remainder of this article will be concerned with the causes
of ethnic identification, polarisation and politicisation.
1.3 Drivers of ethnic consciousness
Labelling a conflict as an ethnic one implies that ethnicity plays a fundamental role in the
conflict. Therefore, it is instructive to review the dominant theories on ethnic identifica-
tion and politicisation: what are the underlying mechanisms that induce popular ethnic
awareness and lead to ethnic polarisation? What drives people to identify themselves
with a certain ethnic marker to such an extent that violence against ‘the other’ seems
acceptable, inevitable or even imperative?
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Definitions
Evidently, in order to analyse and understand a subject, it should be properly defined.
The lively academic debate on ethnicity as a concept and its relation to conflict, however,
suggests conceptual ambiguity:1 neither ethnicity (ethnic identity)2 nor ethnic conflict ap-
pear to be apparent concepts. The common practice among social scientists to stipulate
a definition of the concept as it will be understood throughout their analysis, evidences
this ambiguity.
I believe that a proper definition is especially indispensable when a concept also
commonly occurs in ordinary language. Therefore, I define ethnic identity and ethnic
conflict as they ought to be understood in this paper. Importantly, however, in Section
1.4 I elaborate on the nontrivial relation between these definitions and their ordinary
language interpretation.
The definitions used here are borrowed from, respectively, Chandra [2006] and Gilley
[2004]. These are very intelligible and fairly standard and inclusive definitions:
ethnic identity: is a subset of the “identity categories in which eligibility for member-
ship is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with,
descent,” in which the attributes “include those acquired genetically (skin-colour,
gender, height, etc.), through cultural and historical inheritance (e.g., name, lan-
guage, place of birth, etc.), or in the course of one’s lifetime as markers of such an
inheritance (e.g., last name or tribal markers)” Chandra [2006, p. 398/400].3
ethnic conflict: is a hostile and violent “political or social conflict involving one or more
groups which are identified by some marker of ethnic identity” (Gilley [2004,
p. 1155]).
Dominant theories on ethnic identification
As a categorisation of theories that explain the origin of ethnic groups, the polarisation
and politicisation of ethnic identity, and the emergence of conflict and violence against
such groups, I find the primordial – instrumental categorisation somewhat unsatisfactory
in two senses.4 First, to the extent that even primordial sentiments can be manipulated
and exploited, all theories contain an instrumental aspect. Second, the instrumental cat-
egory makes no distinction between self-interested individuals that use ethnicity as an
instrument to further their personal goals, and individuals that follow self-interested en-
trepreneurs who foster ethnic sentiments in the pursuit of the entrepreneur’s goals. It is
important to note that I distinguish between an individual and an entrepreneur, the latter
being an individual that manipulates other individuals in order to advance his own in-
1To cite just a few recent articles: Le Vine [1997], ‘Conceptualizing ethnicity and ethnic conflict’; Craw-
ford and Lipschutz [1999], ‘The Myth of Ethnic Conflict’; Hale [2004], ‘Explaining Ethnicity’; Gilley [2004],
‘Against the concept of ethnic conflict’ and Chandra [2006], ‘What is ethnic identity and does it matter?’
2Note that I will use the terms ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘ethnicity’ interchangeably throughout the paper.
3See Fearon [1999] for an in-depth discussion on the meaning of ‘identity.’
4Note that the primordial – instrumental categorisation of theories (that I find unsatisfactory) is not
to be confounded with what I advocate in the Introduction and in Section 1.6, which is the primordial –
instrumental categorisation of civil conflicts.
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terests. I return to this issue in Section 1.3, where I elaborate on the distinctive elements
of the different theories that matter most for the current discussion.
Instead, I chose to categorise the theories by the assumed nature of the individual’s
(not the entrepreneur’s) choice process: rational (self-interested) versus non-rational re-
sponses (see, resp., Lake and Rothchild [1996] and Kaufman [2001]).
Rational choice
The self-interest view considers group formation as an individual’s rational choice in the
pursuit of his own interests. Here, the lower costs of information and group formation
attributed to ethnic ties make ethnicity an attractive instrument. We can distinguish two
types of ‘rational’ theories:
Modernisation: increased interaction. A first potential driver of ethnic polarisation is
economic modernisation. The growing social and economic interethnic interaction that
follows from various types of socio-economic processes, like economic development, in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation, is assumed to increase ethnic self-consciousness (Young
[1983]; Newman [1991]).
According to the modernisation theory, ethnic groups are the result of strategic be-
haviour of individuals who form a (‘minimal winning’) coalition (Bates [1983]) – a type
of interest group – to advance common political and economic interests. The process
of economic modernisation, according to Connor [1973], will merge previously isolated
ethnic groups who will compete for the same public goods and scarce resources.
Furthermore, increased interaction in a new socio-economic context will also reveal
barriers (real or not) to upward advancement (Gellner [1983]) and, thus, create a fertile
breeding ground for the politicisation of ethnic identity, orchestrated by political elites.
Modernisation theory, therefore, categorises as an instrumentalist theory in two senses:
ethnic identity is a useful instrument to the individual’s private goals and to an en-
trepreneur that mobilises people to pursue his private goals.
Emerging anarchy: personal fears. A second type of explanation for the polarisation
of ethnic identities builds on the ‘security dilemma’: one group’s measures to increase
its own security may trigger reactions from the other group which, in the end, make
both groups less secure (Posen [1993]). Where states are weak or totally absent, the so-
called ‘emerging anarchy’ where the state is no longer credible as the sole and legitimate
policing power, groups’ uncertainty about their security and survival makes them willing
to invest in protection. The rationale builds on personal fears and requires a certain
degree of risk aversion of the individual, a positive dislike for being killed, as it were.
Lake and Rothchild [1996] discuss both intra- and inter-group strategic interactions
that contribute to the escalation of interethnic contention when the state fails to guaran-
tee security. For a peaceful settlement of communal rivalries to fail, at least one of three
dilemmas must exist: either information failures, problems of credible commitment or
incentives to pre-empt must exist. When acquiring information is too costly, or when
groups have an incentive to misrepresent their intentions, information failures can cause
competition (e.g. the struggle for scarce resources or state control) to become conflict-
ual. Furthermore, when one group can not credibly commit to a mutually advantageous
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agreement, the other group may have an incentive to incur high costs of conflict now,
to avoid exploitation or extermination in the future. And finally, when offensive mili-
tary technology has an advantage over defensive technology, the military build-up in a
security dilemma may create incentives to ‘strike first’ (Jervis [1978]).
Essentially, personal fears that emerge from the failing state create the circumstances
in which malicious leaders and peer pressure can cause rapid polarisation between
groups. A hostile interpretation of history and overemphasising group myths allows
ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs to polarise and mobilise the masses by ex-
ploiting their fear and their desire to belong to a group (Horowitz [1985]; Kuran [1998]).
Two variants of this theory dispute that a failing state would suffice to arouse the
type of fears from which mass violence can erupt. They attribute an initiating role to
predatory political entrepreneurs and armed thugs.
Elite predation. According to de Figueiredo Jr. andWeingast [1999], emerging anar-
chy is insufficient to explain mass violence. The core of the predatory-elites explanation
is that for the masses to engage in (extremely costly) violent activities, they must fear
for their lives. In his ultimate ‘gamble’ to retain power, a weakened political leader may,
therefore, initiate violence in order to provoke extreme fears within the population. Such
extreme fears of being killed will then ‘rationalise’ the killing option. Although the strat-
egy is risky (its success highly depends on [latent] pre-existing fear and on the people’s
incapability to determine who initiated the violence), since the “costs are borne by the
citizenry,” it may well be worthwhile (de Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast [1999, p. 263]).
Armed thugs. Again building on the emerging anarchy and, thus, personal fears,
Brass [1997] and Mueller [2000] suggest yet another explanation for the popular involve-
ment in violence: ethnic or ideological rhetoric by the political entrepreneurs provide a
convenient banner for local bandits, thieves, thugs and opportunists who, in their pur-
suit of private agendas, compel essentially moderate ordinary people to participate in
the violence.
Non-rational response
Instead of being the outcome of rational calculations of its self-interest, some theories
assume that an individual’s choices are non-rational responses (Sears et al. [1979]; El-
ster [1996]). Two theories build on non-rational motives for the identification by ethnic
markers:
Primordialism. The most controversial (and highly contested) ‘emotional’ view is that
ethnic identity is ascriptive and unchangeable, that ethnic identity markers, character-
istics that determine ethnic group membership, are biologically and even genetically
‘fixed.’ The motivation for ethnic affiliation stems from the primordial human urge or
instinct for survival, and violence simply derives from antipathy towards the ‘other.’ The
more moderate view on primordialism is that, rather than the ‘primordial ties’ them-
selves, it is the fact that groups perceive their ties to be primordial that influences their
actual behaviour. Shils [1957, pp. 133–134] talks about an “element of intense mutual
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attachment, independent of primordial ties.” In evolutionary terms, primordialism as-
sumes that “humans have evolved a nepotism instinct that now seizes on any major
physical differences between people to produce group formation” (Hale [2004, p. 460]).
Currently, primordialism seems to have lost most (if not all) of its proponents: the
point being that the claim that ethnic identities are genetically fixed and immutable is
overwhelmingly rejected by factual evidence.5
In its modern form, however, even the primordial view acknowledges an instrumental
element of ethnicity. Van Evera [2001, p. 20] concedes that ethnic identity is probably
‘not stamped on our genes,’ but argues that since the reconstruction of ethnic identity is
extremely slow and hardly ever happens – especially not once a conflict has erupted –
it can ‘seldom serve as a remedy for ethnic conflict today.’ Being hardwired, however, it
can serve as a mobilising tool for ethnically based collective action.
Symbolic politics. Rational choice theory assumes that individuals have a stable set of
ordered preferences on which their utility maximisation is based. The ‘symbolist theory
of choice’ (Kaufman [2006]) – the most recent theory for explaining ethnic identity as a
group creating phenomenon – in contrast, assumes that emotions, rather so than rational
calculations, motivate people’s behaviour.
The argument builds on two assumptions that, together, make ethnic identity emo-
tionally laden: the first is that, through conditioning (exposure to symbols, history,
myth), people acquire a relatively stable set of emotions that guides their affective re-
sponses (Sears et al. [1979]); the second, that relying on group loyalties is evolutionary
favoured over egoism (Kaufman [2001]). An individual’s emotions are, therefore, mal-
leable (albeit only slowly) and ethnic identity is embedded in an individual’s set of
emotional preferences.
The degree to which a group cultivates its shared culture and stimulates a common
interpretation of history – the so-called “myth-symbol complex”6 – plays a pivotal role
in explaining ethnic identity polarisation and ethnic conflict. On the one hand, because it
conditions an individual’s emotions and, therefore, determines an individual’s responses
to political choices. On the other hand, because it can be manipulated and, thus, provides
political entrepreneurs or predatory elites with a tool to arouse mass involvement and
support.
The symbolic theory, like the elite-predation theory, requires a security dilemma,
an opportunity to mobilise and widespread fears for victimisation. Here, however, by
being embedded in the group’s myth-symbol complex, fears are explicitly connected
to emotions. Furthermore, Kaufman [2006] adds a third necessary condition for ethnic
conflict: the prevalence of myths that justify ethnic hostility. If there is a myth, a shared
belief of a righteous claim on a certain territory as the group’s ‘homeland,’ this myth
will justify the use of violence to defend or claim that territory. With these preconditions
fulfilled, either a new opportunity (e.g. state failure) or an intensification of fear and
hostility (through the manipulation of symbols and myths) can trigger ethnic conflict.
5See Fearon and Laitin [2000b] for a brief review of the evidence against primordialism.
6After Anthony Smith, as referred to in Kaufman [2006, p. 50].
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Synthesis
What I hope to have shown by the preceding categorisation of the prominent theories,
is that each theory qualifies as an instrumentalist theory in the broad sense. In ac-
cordance with the general – both empirical and theoretical – economic consensus (see
Section 1.2), each theory allows for ethnic identification to serve as a tool, an instrument
that facilitates collective action. The fundamental difference between the types of the-
oretical explanations, in my opinion, lies in the nature of the individual’s motives: the
rational explanation assumes individuals to calculate their costs and benefits, while the
non-rational explanations assume individuals to respond, primordially or emotionally.
This distinction also illustrates the second issue raised in Section 1.3: according to the
rational theories, as an instrument, ethnicity not only serves an external manipulator.
Ethnic group membership can also be the outcome of an individual’s rational choice.
Most relevant to the central focus of this paper, however, are the extent to which
ethnic affiliation is considered to be innate and immutable, and the potential role the dif-
ferent theories attribute to (political) entrepreneurs in the manipulation or even creation
of ethnic consciousness. Both issues, I believe, are pretty straightforward: except for pri-
mordialism, there is no theoretical support for the innateness of ethnic preferences, and,
as stated above, each of the theoretical explanations allows for the manipulation of such
preferences by all sorts of entrepreneurs.
1.4 Against the concept
The ambiguity about ethnic conflict as a concept, I believe, stems from the fact that
although it is a very well-known concept that most people will use correctly, there is
no such thing as a popular definition of it: the content of ‘ethnicity’ is time and context
specific. As Banton [2000, p. 482] puts it, the mere “presence in a language of a word
does not mean that there is some thing which corresponds to that word.”
However, although it lacks a proper popular definition, in a Third World context,
ethnic conflict has a clear – but ‘primitive’ and therefore pejorative – connotation in both
ordinary language and (Western) journalistic discourse: it is commonly associated with
age-old animosities, with ancient tribal hatred and it evokes irrational enmities ‘seething
since time immemorial’ (Snyder [1993, p. 5]). A popular catchword for – especially
African – communally based contention is ‘tribalism’ (Young and Mirzeler [2002, p. 108]).
To illustrate the discrepancy between a standard theoretical definition of ethnic con-
flict and its popular counterpart, it is useful to decompose the academic definition I posit
in Section 1.3 according to the types of conflict it covers: the first, and most intuitive,
category are conflicts that are motivated by feelings of overt ethnic loathing. A second
category are conflicts where ethnic identity is a criterion of group selection, where it is
used to create internal cohesion and differentiation from other (ethnic) groups in order
to pursue common (non-ethnic) goals. Finally, conflicts may be labelled ethnic if they are
fought in the interest or in the name of an ethnic group (Fearon and Laitin [2000a]).
From this decomposition it should be clear that although they differ substantially,
by the first category, the theoretical definition encompasses the popular interpretation.
Therefore, on top of the pejorative connotation of the concept, there is a caveat: however
careful scholars define their subject, the media and the public opinion will naturally be
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inclined to envisage ethnicity in itself, ancient hatred towards the ‘other,’ as the motivat-
ing purpose of contention. A problem with labelling a conflict ethnic, in other words, lies
in the fact that there is very little (if any) empirical evidence or theoretical underpinning
for what is commonly understood by that label (Fearon and Laitin [2000b]; Kaufman
[2006]).
Besides this popular misconception and the pejorative connotation attached to it,
ethnic conflict also has a conceptual flaw: it fails to “point to a distinctive causal ex-
planation” for certain types of conflict (Gilley [2004, p. 1158]). Besides asserting that
these are all instances where groups have aligned along (alleged) ethnic markers, it is
highly questionable that calling the Rwandan genocide, the Balkan war and the conflict
in Southern Sudan ethnic conflicts, contributes to a better understanding of the causes
of these conflicts, of the dissimilarities between these conflicts and non-ethnic ones. It
is, in other words, debatable whether focusing on ethnicity contributes to make more
efficacious causal inferences, especially when ethnic consciousness is not the driver of
the conflict.
1.5 Rwanda
The Rwandan genocide and the build-up towards it, provide a tragic illustration of the
preceding discussion. I start with a short narrative on the history of Rwanda, after which
I elaborate on the interplay between economic pressures and ethnic politicisation. In
Section 1.5, I discuss the more plausible mechanisms through which ethnicity in Rwanda
got politicised to such a level that it ‘rationalised’ widespread violence.
A brief history of Rwanda
Bantu peasants and Nilo-Hamitic aristocrats are among the world’s most notorious eth-
nic groups. Better known as Hutus and Tutsis, they were the key actors in one of the most
horrifying events in modern history, in what is generally considered to be the archetype
of contemporary ethnic conflict: the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where, officially, about a
million people were killed.
In spite of the well-documented fact that the initial violence was not ethnically in-
spired but rather political – within hours after the killing of President Habyarimana, ‘the
“enemies” of the regime’ (both moderate Hutus and Tutsis) were killed (Newbury [1998,
p. 80]) – the perception of Rwanda as a country divided by ‘ancient tribal hatred’ and
of the Rwandan slaughtering as a ‘cro´nica de un genocidio anunciado’ remains among
policy-makers and Western media. It is, therefore, useful to briefly narrate the history of
Rwanda.
There is considerable (academic) debate on the true nature and the timing of ethnic
polarisation in Rwanda (see, e.g., Chre´tien [1994]; de Waal [1997]; Newbury and New-
bury [1999]; Taylor [2004]; Vansina [2005]; Platteau [2008]). Since the subject of debate
is not essential to the current analysis, I tried to remain as close as possible to the most
general consensus on the history of Rwanda.
Modern Rwanda has its economic, social and political roots in the former Nyiginya
Kingdom, which emerged early 17th century (Vansina [2005]). The ruling class and aris-
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tocracy were clearly dominated by the Tutsi lineage, while the cultivators and servants
were predominantly labelled ‘Hutu’ (another socio-economic step down the ladder were
the Twa). This distinction, however, was not mutually ‘exclusive’: there was significant
upward and downward mobility (Maquet [1954]). Just as one could ‘leave the condition
of being Hutu’ and become part of the ruling elite and, thus, integrate in the Tutsi lineage
(for example through intermarriage), a Tutsi could lose his status and become a cultiva-
tor (for example by losing his cattle wealth). Being a Tutsi, in other words, referred to
the privileges and status one held.
A first rigidification and polarisation of ethnicity in Rwanda occurred at the end of
the 19th century, when cultivators (by definition Hutus) were ordered to provide labour
to the ruling elite (the wealthy class, predominantly Tutsis). A second, and decisive rigid-
ification occurred under Belgian colonial rule (1919–1962). By issuing identity cards that
sealed one’s ethnicity, and by ruling indirectly through the local authority of the Tutsi
minority,7 the coloniser clearly rigidified and polarised the Rwandan traditional society
and portrayed the Tutsis as the apparent agents of colonisation (Newbury [1993]). In
spite of these waves of rigidification, it is interesting to note ‘how quickly and drastically
such seemingly ‘fixed’ identities can change’8 (Waters [1995, p. 343]).
Furthermore, under Belgian colonial rule, the Rwandan economy was transformed
from a barter and gift economy to a commercialised cash-crop economy, focused on
the export-oriented production of coffee (Hintjens [2001]). Tutsi chiefs were granted the
authority to levy Hutu peasant labour contributions to the coffee plantations (Kamola
[2007]). Besides increasing the Rwandan economic dependence on international coffee
prices as a source of foreign currency, this structural economic transformation further
enforced ethnic segregation and, thus, Hutu (and Twa) grievances and it contributed to
the further perpetuation of the ‘Hamitic Myth,’ the cultural myth of Tutsi superiority9
(Prunier [1995]).
Increasing international pressure and domestic opposition urged colonial administra-
tion to gradually provide Hutus with more (especially educational) opportunities, which
led to even more domestic Hutu opposition and, by the end of colonisation, the highly
propagated myth of ‘Hutu revolution’ which waged until 1962 (see Des Forges [1999]
for an interesting account on the Hutu myth-creation). The Hutu revolt started with the
toppling of the (Tutsi) monarchy in 1959 and culminated in independence, with a Hutu,
Gre´goire Kayibanda, as the first president. Those three years of Hutu revolution marked
the start of the so-called history of ethnic violence in Rwanda: a series of attacks and
reprisals in the Northern provinces (by then, Belgium had switched sides and backed
the Hutu) led to the assassination of thousands and the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Rwandan Tutsis (Hintjens [2001]).
7About 15% of the total population are Tutsis, 84% are Hutus and about 1% are Twa, who were de facto
neglected.
8Allegedly, ‘many Tutsi concealed their ethnicity and had their national identity cards marked ‘Hutu” (Taylor
[2004, p. 369, note 2.]).
9The Hamitic Myth derives from the Hamitic Hypothesis that “states that everything of value ever
found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race” (Sanders
[1969, p. 521]). This racist myth holds that Africa was initially exclusively inhabited by ‘Negroes’ who were
“incapable of discriminating or abstract thought” (MacGaffey [1978, p. 111]) and that Caucasoid Hamites
gradually ‘upgraded’ the African population. The Tutsis, according to the Hamitic Myth, are Hamites, the
Hutus Negroes.
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After the Hutu revolution, many Tutsis were forced into exile in several waves of
Hutu hostilities which were justified by a reversal of the Hamitic myth (Tutsis were now
pictured as ‘foreigners’). Expelled from their home country and mostly unwanted in
the host country, the (growing) Tutsi community in exile in the neighbouring countries
grew increasingly militant and visible. This increasing external threat of invasion, com-
pounded with the history of Hutu oppression during the Tutsi-monarchy, and a history
of recurrent hostilities and overt discrimination against the Tutsis during Hutu-rule, set
the stage for a culture of fear on both sides (Newbury [1995]; Eriksson [1996]).
Another well-established (but far less publicised) fault line in Rwanda is the socio-
political (clearly non-ethnic) inter-elite north-south Hutu-division. Under Kayibanda, the
southern Hutu elite seized control over the administration and the coffee industry, the
two most valuable resources of the Rwandan economy. When Habyarimana took over in
1972, the coffee economy was further developed and, in turn, so designed as to optimally
serve the interests of the northern elites. Thus, although initially neither Kayibanda nor
Habyarimana pursued an outspoken ethnic political agenda, the systematic patronising
of their regional kin eventually resulted in a further politicisation of ethnicity in Rwanda:
to divert the inevitable inter-elite grievances their respective presidencies elicited, both
regimes ‘played the ethnic card’ on several occasions, by explicitly and ‘repeatedly artic-
ulating the Tutsis as a common enemy’ (Kamola [2007, p. 581]). The chronic exploitation
of the common enemy gradually deepened the cleavages and further enforced the preva-
lence of fear.
The socio-economic context on the eve of the 1994 genocide
In retrospect, it is possible to identify some key events that contributed to a precarious
socio-economic context in the early 1990s.
From the late 1980s, Rwanda faced serious economic decline. Two consecutive col-
lapses in the international coffee prices, a first of 42% in 1986 and a second of 50% in
198910 (by then, coffee was the country’s main export product) and the increasing war
efforts in response to the growing threat of insurgency by the Tutsi-diaspora, resulted in
a severe economic crisis which especially hit the rural dwellers and the urban poor. Pres-
sure for economic reforms by the World Bank and the IMF further exacerbated economic
austerity and deepened internal grievances.
International pressure to end the intensifying cleavages in the northern provinces in-
creased. Habyarimana was put under severe pressure by the international community
and by the moderate Hutu-opposition to accept power sharing with the insurgents, the
Tutsis from the RPF. By the time the contending parties were negotiating a peace agree-
ment in Arusha (August 1993), some successful RPF military offensives had substantially
increased that party’s bargaining power, which resulted in a relatively favourable peace
settlement on their behalf. This further increased political polarisation among moderate
and extremist Hutus, the latter blaming Habyarimana for these ‘unfavourable’ agree-
ments and calling for a more radical attitude towards the Tutsis.
Finally, the murdering of the Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, in Octo-
ber 1993, allegedly by Tutsis from within the army, further nurtured fear among the Hutu
10In 1986 prices dropped from 204 to 118 US cents/pound and in 1989 from 126 to 63 US cents/pound
(Composite Indicator Prices from the International Coffee Organization: http://www.ico.org/).
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population for renewed Tutsi dominance in Rwanda. The mutual killings that erupted in
Burundi, up to 100.000 casualties in the first three months after the coup, also generated
an exodus towards Rwanda, an influx of hundreds of thousands impoverished and often
traumatised Hutu refugees that further polarised the Rwandan political and civil society
(Uvin [1999]; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza [2000]).
Uncovering the mechanism
In this section I briefly discuss the 1994 genocide in Rwanda within the framework of
the two most plausible theories for this case: first, from the brief history of Rwanda in
Section 1.5, it should be clear that primordialism does not provide a satisfactory explana-
tion of the Rwandan genocide. Furthermore, in retrospect we know that political elites
played an essential role in the creation of fears and myths. Therefore, although from
Section 1.3 we know that all theories other than primordialism may explain (part of)
the genocide, especially the ‘rational’ elite predation theory (fears) and the ‘emotional’
symbolic politics theory (fears and myths) appear relevant.
Elite predation in Rwanda. Was there an ‘ultimate gamble for resurrection’ in Rwanda?
Was there an incumbent elite that was losing (or feared to lose) control over the state
apparatus and was willing to gamble, willing to plunge the country into mayhem and
bloodshed in order to retain power?
The argument is fairly simple: economic decline, pressure for democratisation, con-
secutive (and increasingly successful) RPF invasions and, ultimately, the Arusha Peace
Accords which dramatically weakened the Habyarimana-regime internally, raised the
stakes for gambling (de Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast [1999]).
With intensified mutual distrust and a legacy of fear (of Tutsi-oppression and Hutu-
violence), sharpened by the murdering of president Ndadaye in Burundi and by recur-
ring violent clashes between the Rwandan army and the RPF, the instigation of violence
by the incumbent elite (the extremist Hutu faction) may indeed have been that elite’s
ultimate gamble for resurrection.
Symbolic politics in Rwanda. The symbolic politics theory requires hostile myths, ex-
treme ethnic fears and an opportunity to mobilise. Then, chauvinist manipulation of
ethnic symbols can trigger an emotional response by the masses, a willingness to mur-
der in order not to be murdered (Kaufman [2006]).
Obviously, both sides intensely cultivated their hostile myths: the Hamitic myth of
Tutsi superiority that justifies ‘natural’ Tutsi-rule, and the myth of Hutu-revolution that
glorifies the legitimate reclaiming of Rwanda by its original inhabitants. Moreover, dur-
ing the more than 30 years of independence, both sides – the Tutsis by emphasising the
recurrent Hutu hostilities and permanent discrimination, and the Hutus by propagating
the fear for oppression by the Tutsis who claim to be superior – repeatedly “called on
history to claim the rightness of their cause,” thus feeding ethnic fears (Newbury [1995,
p. 13]). Finally, being in charge, the Hutu regime obviously had an opportunity to mo-
bilise the masses and they took it: the infamous hate radio ‘Radio Te´le´vision Libre des
Mille Collines’ proved to be an extremely effective tool.
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The prerequisites for successful chauvinist manipulation of symbols, in order to
evoke group mythology, therefore, appeared to be present indeed. On the Tutsi side,
the physical appearance of Paul Kagame clearly appealed to the Hamitic-myth of tall
and superior Tutsis. The Hutus, from their side, revived the horror of Tutsi oppression
with slogans, cartoons, pamphlets, etc. using words like slavery, feudalism and bloody
emasculation.
1.6 Concluding remarks
By exploring the Rwandan case in such detail I had no intention of siding with either of
the proposed theoretical explanations. I merely hope to have exhibited that primordial-
ism is by no means a suitable explanation for the 1994 atrocities, neither from a historical
nor from an theoretical point of view. It is impossible to substantiate the claim – a view so
massively propagated by Western media and by prominent policy makers, both during
and in the aftermath of the genocide – that the genocide was the result of a centuries-old
feud, pure tribalism, innate ethnic dislikes, etc. between the Hutus and the Tutsis.
Therefore, considering that labelling a conflict ethnic does not seem to contribute to
a more focused analysis of a particular type of internal conflicts, and acknowledging
that international reporting reaches citizens (and certainly political entrepreneurs) in
the developing world (Collier [2007, pp. 22/147]), I conclude by summarising the three
principal arguments against the use of ethnic as a discriminating label in the analysis of
civil conflict.
First, the academic use of ethnicity, however accurately framed it may be, reifies the
concept and propels its – far less accurate – use in a more general (Western) discourse.
Thereby, it propagates or even establishes a public consciousness susceptible to ethnically
framed aspirations (Fearon and Laitin [2000b]). It is this consciousness to which perfid-
ious and unscrupulous (political) entrepreneurs appeal when seeking support from the
diaspora (King and Melvin [1999]; Carter [2007]), the international community and even
humanitarian organisations (Maren [1999]; Griffin [2000]).
Second, labelling communal tension as ethnic may contribute to the creation of a
common ethnic history, a common myth, even in cases where ethnic boundaries were
clearly constructed. As we saw in Section 1.3 and Section 1.5, the cultivation, celebration
and exploitation of such myths can have appalling consequences (Newbury [1995]; de
Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast [1999]; Kaufman [2006]).
Finally, the contemptuous image and – especially – the sense of inevitability the ethnic
label evokes (primitive, tribal, irrational, etc.) makes the general opinion (the electorate)
receptive to a political discourse that advocates laissez-faire, a discourse that justifies
non-intervention if the stakes are low. For instance, Mr. Bush Sr. who calls the war in
the Balkans “a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out of age-old animosities,” and
infers from it that “the violence will not end overnight, whatever pressure and means the
international community brings to bear” (Rosenthal [August 7th, 1992]), or the Clinton
Administration that instructs its spokesmen not to call the mass killings in Rwanda a
‘genocide,’ but rather tribal conflicts erupting from ancient hatreds (Jehl [1994]; Wharton
Jr. [1994]), illustrate that a primordial interpretation of the conflict, linking such outbreaks
of violence to age-old enmities, is not as rash or innocent as it may look: it seems to free
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policy makers, political entrepreneurs or elites and the international community from its
responsibilities (Brass [1997]). Or, like Sadowski [1998, p. 13] formulates it: “The claim
that ethnic conflicts have deep roots has long been a standard argument for not getting
involved.”
Moreover, I hope to have illustrated that even though it may be accurately defined in
academic research, using a concept that lacks an accurate popular definition, may not be
without consequences. Therefore, in the same way as we distinguish between ‘murder
in the first degree’ (a deliberate killing with robbery for instance) and ‘manslaughter’
(for example in the heat of passion) even though both may have been committed with
a knife, I believe that academic research on civil conflict should be more accurate in
distinguishing between conflicts with a fundamentally different motive. Be it merely as
a tentative suggestion, I believe that distinguishing between, for example, an instrumental
ethnic conflict – where ethnicity serves as a mobilising or antagonising tool, an instrument
in the pursuit of economic or political goals – and a primordial ethnic conflict – where
ethnic dislikes drive the conflict – would both serve the academic debate and circumvent
the possible abuse ‘ethnic conflict’ entails.

2NATURAL RESOURCES AND CIV IL CONFL ICT
With Dirk Van de gaer
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies how the type of natural resources present in a country may affect
group behaviour and the effectiveness of trust manipulation in that country. To this end,
we develop a game in which we consider two risk-neutral utility maximising identifiable
groups and examine how their behaviour is influenced by natural resources and how
these resources determine the impact of the group’s belief that the other group will
cooperate (the level of trust) and of foreign intervention, through the manipulation of
the balance of power between groups on the occurrence of conflict.
We consider two groups that decide on whether or not to accept a group neutral al-
location of value added, i.e. on whether or not to invest in arms and claim a preferential
treatment of the own group. In this, conflict stems from utility-maximising decisions by
the groups: when the perceived economic opportunities from non-cooperation outweigh
those of cooperating, ‘conflict’ is the rational strategy. If only one group claims a pref-
erential treatment in the allocation of value added, society becomes stratified, with that
group dominant. In our model such an asymmetric equilibrium, which has received lit-
tle attention in the literature so far, occurs for some economies.1 Following a mechanism
similar to the sparse network mechanism described by Humphreys [2005], stratification
hampers interaction between groups and decreases trade and social capital. These so-
cietal costs decrease the value added that is to be distributed. If both groups claim a
preferential treatment, war results. Infrastructure is then destroyed, which results in
additional costs for society, a further decrease of value added. The size of the stakes
thus depends on societal costs of conflict. As Weingast [1998, p. 163] puts it, “the fun-
damental economic puzzle of ethnification concerns its huge costs”: stratified economies
are plagued by discrimination, repression, and their economic cost, and war-torn coun-
tries are ravaged by devastating humanitarian catastrophes, psychological traumas and
a disrupted growth generating apparatus. Therefore, we believe that by theorising the
occurrence of stratified and conflictual societies, this paper deals with a fundamental
issue.
We postulate that the magnitude of societal costs of conflict is determined by the pres-
ence and the type of natural resources and by the structure of the economic activity. Our
typology distinguishes four types of economies. In diversified economies trade is essen-
tial in creating value added. Therefore, they face high costs of stratification and war. In
subsistence economies, economic activity heavily depends on subsistence agriculture and
local trade. Stratification costs hamper local trade, but the additional costs of war can be
limited. In support of these assumptions, Miguel and Roland [2006, p. 19] attribute the
absence of long term economic consequences and, more importantly, the quicker recov-
1The partial cooperation equilibrium in Skaperdas [1992], where only one of the players invests in arms,
is similar to our asymmetric equilibrium.
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ery of the Vietnamese economy from extensive U.S. bombing between 1965–1975 than
the Japanese and German recovery from Allied bombing during World War II (Davis
and Weinstein [2002]; Brakman et al. [2004]), to the predominantly agrarian nature of
the Vietnamese economy. Economies that depend on capital and labour intensive agri-
culture of geographically spread crops like cotton, tobacco, tea, bananas, rubber, sugar,
etc. (hereafter, plantation economies2 (Pryor [1982])), face limited stratification costs but
incur large costs of war. Finally, we single out economies that depend on resources that
can continue to generate value added even if society is stratified or if other parts of the
country face war; we call these economies ‘robust resource dependent.’ This new con-
cept covers two known concepts: point resources like oil or kimberlite diamonds, which
are highly concentrated and easily controlled (Auty [2001] and Le Billon [2001]), and
lootable resources like coltan or alluvial diamonds, which are inexpensively harvested
and easily smuggled (Ross [2003]). Therefore, supported by Guidolin and La Ferrara
[2007] who show that certain sectors may even benefit from war (alluvial diamond min-
ing, for instance), we assume that robust resource dependent economies have low costs
of stratification and war. In Section 2.2 we further elaborate on the relevance of the
type of economic activity for the equilibrium. Note, however, the analogy with Collier’s
[1999, p. 179] partial ranking of sectors with respect to their degree of war-vulnerability:
in a diversified economy value added is predominantly created in ‘war-vulnerable’ sec-
tors, while the subsistence economies essentially depend on ‘war-invulnerable’ sectors.
Therefore, although we differentiate between costs of segregation and costs of conflict,
to the extent that we further disaggregate the ‘unclassified’ group, our typology could
be viewed as a refinement of Collier’s.3
We model a game under incomplete information. We assume rational behaviour
where groups know their own payoff, and since the game is symmetric, they also know
the other group’s payoff. Groups know, furthermore, that no group will ever choose,
irrespective of its beliefs, a strategy which yields, for every action of the other player, a
lower payoff than another strategy (a so-called dominated strategy). Therefore, the natu-
ral solution is to eliminate dominated strategies. In a similar way as Wood [2003], when
the equilibrium concepts fails to generate a unique equilibrium, the equilibrium is deter-
mined by each player’s exogenous belief that the other player will choose the cooperative
strategy. The reason we keep beliefs exogenous is threefold: first, in a dynamic setting,
as the repeated nature of the game reveals information about the other player’s chosen
strategy, it is reasonable to assume that players form correct – and thus equilibrium – be-
liefs in the long run. In a static setting, however, the ‘information updating mechanism’
is absent.4 Equilibrium beliefs seem, furthermore, rather ill-suited to explain certain
historical facts. Often “groups involved in protracted conflicts . . . end to read different
newspapers (often in different languages), attend different religious institutions . . . and
listen to different sets of politicians who profit from heightening fear, distrust, and antag-
onism.” (Malhotra and Liyanage [2005, p. 912]). Groups, therefore, may not have enough
2Note that these plantation economies are closely related to the diffuse resource dependent economies
in Auty [2001] and Le Billon [2001].
3The classification in Collier [1999] serves to derive testable predictions on the impact of civil war on the
composition of GDP. Although our model is static, it should be clear that the typology we propose could
serve a similar purpose.
4Our two-stage game is a static game since the second stage offers no new information to the game.
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adequate information to develop equilibrium beliefs. Finally, by keeping beliefs exoge-
nous, we overcome the multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Where elimination of dominated
strategies fails to generate a unique equilibrium, there are three Nash equilibria: two in
pure strategies and one in mixed strategies. Exogenous beliefs allow us to characterise a
unique equilibrium outcome for all the parameter values we consider.
The core focus of this paper is the interaction between the type of natural resources,
which determines the societal costs of conflict, and the occurrence of conflict. The in-
novation of our approach is that we link the composition of a country’s value-creating
activities to its proneness to civil conflict. We show that especially robust resource de-
pendent economies are conflict prone. Furthermore, our model predicts that foreign
intervention, aimed at influencing the balance of power between two groups in case of
conflict, will be more effective in resource dependent economies.5 We also show that trust
manipulation can only be effective in subsistence and plantation economies. Finally, we
show that stratified societies tend to occur in plantation economies.
Our paper builds on two lively debates in development research which have attracted
the attention of economists, political scientists and sociologists: the causal mechanism
that links natural resources to civil conflicts and the possible connection between ethnic
diversity and social conflicts or civil wars.
In two seminal papers, Collier and Hoeffler [1998, 2004], the prominent representa-
tives of the economic branch of the resource – war literature, demonstrate the role of
opportunity costs for rebellion and potential rents from lootable resources. The political
branch finds the empirical results unconvincing. Instead, political scientists postulate
a prominent role for the quality of institutions in the mechanism that links natural re-
sources to conflict. According to – among others – Fearon and Laitin [2003] the need
for a strong bureaucratic system to raise tax revenues is less urgent for oil producing
states, which, as a consequence, develop weaker state structures within which rebellion
is a more alluring strategy.6 These factors also play a role in our model. Opportunity
costs play a role because they determine the private costs of conflict. Lootable resources
belong to the category of robust resources and play a role through what we labelled
societal costs of conflict. In weak states the probability that a rebellion is successful is
larger, i.e., the balance of power is more in favour of rebellion than in strong states.
Recently, the ethnic diversity ‘curse’ has been given a new impetus by Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol [2005]: their index of fractionalisation overcomes the weak explanatory
power of ethnic diversity on the incidence of civil conflicts, found by several other recent
studies. The ethnic character of these conflicts, however, is debatable. The term ‘ethnic
conflict’ suggests that ethnic preferences or sentiments are the ‘engine that powers’ the
conflict (Brogan [1989]; Banton [2000]; Bhavnani [2006]), which need not necessarily be
the case. Since ethnic mobilisation is well known as a highly efficient form of collective
action for individuals or elites to pursue private interests (Banton [2000]; Fenton [2004]),
it might as well be that manipulated ethnic awareness, rather than ethnic sentiments or
deeply set hatred, powers the conflict. We believe that our mechanism (trust manipula-
tion) describes how and under what conditions ethnic awareness affects the occurrence
5In a companion paper we study other types of intervention besides changing the balance of power (see
Schollaert and Van de gaer [2008]).
6Both the political and economic branch tend to agree on the negative impact of primary commodity
dependence on political stability (Sachs and Warner [2001], Ron [2005]).
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of conflict.
Two player games have been extensively studied in the literature on conflict. Seminal
papers by Skaperdas [1992] and Hirshleifer [1995] primarily focus on the fighting tech-
nology, how technological aspects of conflict affect the equilibrium strategies of contend-
ing groups. Azam [2002] formulates a general equilibrium model of conflict between
ethnoregional groups in which decisions about the allocation of group members over
production, fighting and looting are determined in a simultaneous game by warlords
heading both groups. Wood [2003] develops a model with two groups to analyse the
conditions under which a civil war settlement, once reached, is self-enforcing and robust
to actor’s confidence that the other will abide by the agreement. Addison et al. [2002]
construct a model in which a government and a rebel group decide to undertake peaceful
actions, which affect the probability of peace. While in these papers, and especially the
latter, there is some discussion on certain aspects of the role played by a country’s type
of natural resources, none of them discusses their influence on societal costs of conflict
and the effectiveness of trust manipulation and foreign intervention to the extent we do
in the present paper.
Finally, conceptually, we can summarise the three contributions of our paper to the
literature on the role of natural resources in civil conflict as follows: first, we iden-
tify robust resources as a pertinent type for analysing the resource – conflict link: low
costs of stratification and conflict explain why both point and lootable resource depen-
dent economies are susceptible to conflict. Second, besides opportunity costs and the
quality of institutions, we establish the manipulation of trust as a third possible mech-
anism through which natural resource abundance can elicit conflict in subsistence and
plantation economies. Finally, our model allows for the existence of asymmetric (strat-
ified) equilibria and shows that such equilibria are most likely to occur in plantation
economies.
In Section 3.2 we formalise the basic assumptions and the corresponding payoffs of
the model. Section 2.3 analyses the unique equilibria that result from the iterated elim-
ination of dominated strategies and in Section 2.4 we discuss the impact of exogenous
trust on the resulting equilibria. Finally, Section 4.7 presents our conclusions.
2.2 Assumptions and payoffs
Assumptions
Let two groups, K and L, account for the total population at working age with α and
(1− α) their respective population shares. As usual in the literature (Robinson [2001]),
we abstract from the within-group coordination and free-riding problems.7
We model how the value added will be distributed. We consider a two stage game
where average value added per worker equals Y. In the first stage, groups either coop-
erate with (C) or fight (F) the other group. By cooperating, the group accepts a group
neutral distribution of value added. By fighting, the group claims a preferential treat-
ment of its members in the distribution of value added. We get four potential outcomes
7This can be rationalised, see e.g. Roemer [1985]. See also Bhavnani [2006] for how ethnic norms,
supported by coercion, can unify a group’s actions.
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of the game: both cooperate, (C,C); K fights and L cooperates, (F,C); K cooperates and
L fights, (C, F); and (F, F) when both fight. This corresponds to the following societies:
(C,C): fully integrated society (C, F): stratified society (L dominates)
(F,C): stratified society (K dominates) (F, F): conflictual society
In the second stage the value added is distributed. In this sense, as in Roemer [1985],
‘conflict’ is treated as a redistribution problem. We keep this stage utterly simple. If both
groups cooperate, the distribution is random and on average everybody gets Y. If only
one group fights, this group becomes dominant: it seizes political and economic power
and apportions the value created in the economy. We assume that all members of the
dominant group receive the same share of the value added.
Finally, to resolve the conflict in a conflictual society, we include an exogenous vari-
able ρ (resp. [1− ρ]) that reflects the probability that group K (resp. L) will manage to
appropriate the value added. This situation, where both groups invest in arms, can be
referred to as war: “the two players engage in open conflict with a probabilistic result”
(Skaperdas [1992, p. 722]). ρ is a measure of relative power of group K and allows for
different interpretations like, for example, a negotiated division of the value added, or
the outcome of a winner-take-all contest, with ρ as the player’s probability of winning
(Neary [1997]). Therefore, ρ is an obvious channel through which interested parties can
manipulate the outcome of the game: intervention can change relative power and, con-
sequently, the optimal strategies. In order to analyse the effects of changes in ρ, we keep
it exogenous.8
We assign two types of costs to fighting and conflict. First, stratified and conflictual
societies suffer societal costs. In a stratified society, the per capita value created by
the productive sector (per capita national income) is reduced to δ1Y. The robustness
coefficient δ1 (0 < δ1 < 1) is inversely related to a wide range of stratification costs
like, e.g., the misallocation of resources (less trade, misallocation of talent), the negative
incentive effects of nepotism and discrimination, a lower social capital stock, etc. We
assume that these costs are lower (i.e. δ1 is higher) for societies that depend on the
exploitation of natural resources than for diversified or subsistent economies.
In a conflictual society (‘war’) all economic activity gets disrupted and infrastructure
destructed.9 Therefore, we assume costs to be even higher: per capita national income is
reduced to δ1δ2Y, where δ2 (0 < δ2 < 1) is a second robustness coefficient. It is inversely
related to the additional implosion of national income due to conflict. The magnitude
of societal costs of stratification and conflict crucially depends on the kind of economic
activity that generates high value added. As stated in the introduction, we posit that
these costs are lower for robust resource dependent and subsistent societies than for
plantation-dependent or diversified societies. Figure 2.1 summarises the relation between
the structure of the economy and the societal costs of conflict.
Second, the fighting strategy carries a private cost. To implement preferential treat-
ment in the second stage, a group needs to be able to enforce it, for example by purchas-
ing arms and spending time and effort (income foregone) in enforcement. This entails a
8Partly endogenising it, by making it dependent on α, complicates some comparative statics, but does
not change the qualitative results of the model.
9Hirshleifer [1988, p. 205] calls it battle damage.
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Figure 2.1: Typology of economies
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private cost for each member of the group equal to c > 0. Without this expenditure, the
execution of the separation strategy in the second stage is not credible since the dominant
group has no means to enforce its dominance.10
The payoff matrix
Without loss of generality, the symmetric nature of the game allows us to focus on the
case where α < 1/2, such that K is the smaller group. The following matrix summarises
the payoffs of the game. Straightforward calculation shows that individuals’ payoffs
are:11
(L)
C F
C Y (Y) 0
(
1
(1−α) δ1Y− c
)
K
F 1α δ1Y− c (0) ρα δ1δ2Y− c
(
(1−ρ)
(1−α) δ1δ2Y− c
)
2.3 Characterisation of the equilibria
In this section we focus on the parameter values for which the elimination of dominated
strategies results in a unique equilibrium.
Elimination of dominated strategies
Let H ∈ {K, L} and X,Z ∈ {C, F}. uH(X,Z) then represents the average payoff for a
worker of group H if group K plays strategy X and L plays strategy Z. The dominated
10Due to the higher national income in such countries, private costs of conflict, in terms of foregone
earnings, can be assumed to be higher in diversified economies. In our model, however, it is c/Y that
matters. So, as long as this remains similar for all types of economies, the only interaction with natural
resources occurs through the societal costs of conflict.
11By assuming that individual’s utility functions are linear in income, we assume that they are risk
neutral.
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strategies can be eliminated directly. For player K strategy C dominates strategy F if and
only if the following inequalities hold true:
uK (C,C) > uK (F,C)⇔ δ1 < α (1+ c/Y) = δ∗1K , (2.1)
uK (C, F) > uK (F, F)⇔ δ2 < α
ρ
1
δ1
c
Y
= δ∗2K (δ1) . (2.2)
For player L strategy C dominates strategy F if and only if we have:
uL (C,C) > uL (C, F)⇔ δ1 < (1− α) (1+ c/Y) = δ∗1L , (2.3)
uL (F,C) > uL (F, F)⇔ δ2 < 1− α1− ρ
1
δ1
c
Y
= δ∗2L (δ1) . (2.4)
δ∗1K and δ
∗
1L are critical values of δ1 for which, if δ1 < δ
∗
1H , player H chooses to cooperate
if the other player cooperates. δ∗2K and δ
∗
2L are critical values of δ2 for which, if δ2 < δ
∗
2H ,
player H chooses to cooperate if the other player fights. δ∗1H is increasing in c/Y and in
the size of group H; δ∗2H is increasing in c/Y and in the size of the group relative to its
power in a conflictual society, and decreasing in δ1.
Figure 2.2: α < 1/2; α < ρ and c/Y < α(1−ρ)(1−α)−α(1−ρ)
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In Figure 3.1 we trace out the respective areas for which the elimination of dominated
strategies generates a unique equilibrium.12 We can see that for sufficiently low robust-
ness coefficients (δ1, δ2), the cooperative equilibrium (a fully integrated society) will come
about. This is the area where the cooperative strategy dominates the conflict strategy for
both players. Analogously, for high values of δ1 and δ2 fighting dominates cooperating
12Figure 3.1 is the most general case containing all the possible areas the model can cover. We need
several restrictions on c/Y to obtain this case. We need for all H ∈ {K, L}: δ∗1H < 1 and δ∗2L (δ∗1K ) < 1.
The latter requires that c/Y < α(1−ρ)(1−α)−α(1−ρ) . The two other restrictions are satisfied automatically if this
restriction holds, given that we consider the case where α < 1/2 and α < ρ.
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for both players and the non-cooperative equilibrium (a conflictual society) results. Now,
consider the area where δ1 < δ∗1K and δ
∗
2K < δ2 < δ
∗
2L (area A©). Equation (2.3) and (2.4)
respectively show that L prefers to cooperate both when K cooperates13 and when K
fights. Player K knows that cooperation dominates fighting for L, so K eliminates L’s
fighting strategy from the game. Then, given that L will cooperate, K will also do so
(δ1 < δ∗1K ). Therefore, the cooperative equilibrium results. Similarly, within the areas
determined by δ∗1K < δ1 < δ
∗
1L or by δ
∗
2K < δ2 < δ
∗
2L , elimination of dominated strategies
results in the unique equilibrium indicated in Figure 3.1. Finally, within TL and BR
elimination of dominated strategies does not generate a unique equilibrium. In Section
2.4 we show that in these areas expectations matter for both players. We first summarise
our discussion:
Proposition 1. Society will be
. fully integrated if δ1 < δ∗1K and δ2 < δ
∗
2L(δ1);
. stratified with the smallest group dominant if
δ∗1K < δ1 < δ
∗
1L and δ2 < δ
∗
2L(δ1), or
δ∗1L < δ1 and δ
∗
2K(δ1) < δ2 < δ
∗
2L(δ1);
. conflictual if δ1 > δ∗1K and δ2 > δ
∗
2L(δ1).
In order to provide some intuition on the role of expectations, define pieLC (pi
e
KC ) as
the probability with which player K (L) expects L (K) to be cooperative. In areas A©, B©
and E©, δ1 < δ∗1L and δ2 < δ∗2L . This implies that irrespective of K’s strategy, L cooperates.
With full information on the payoffs, player K knows that player L’s strategy does not
depend on his beliefs, so that pieLC = 1 and, therefore, Equation (2.1) describes his choice
problem. δ1 < δ∗1K in area A© and δ1 > δ∗1K in area B© and E© imply that K cooperates in A©
and fights in B© and E©. Analogously, in areas C© and D©, δ1 > δ∗1K and δ2 > δ∗2K implies
that K fights in both areas: pieKC = 0. Hence, with δ2 < δ
∗
2L in area C© and δ2 > δ∗2L in area
D©, L cooperates in the former area and fights in the latter.
Interestingly, cooperation by one of the players not necessarily induces cooperation
by the other: in B©, while K knows that L cooperates, K will fight; and in C©, although L
knows that K will fight, L still cooperates. This proves our claim that stratified societies
can be the result of optimal strategic choice by each group.
Overview of the model
The game produces nine equilibrium areas, two of which are, so far, undetermined: TL
and BR. These areas will be discussed in Section 2.4. In the other seven, the elimination
of dominated strategies in a two stage game generates a unique equilibrium.
Which types of equilibrium areas the game produces, is determined by the size of
c/Y relative to δ1 and δ2: as c/Y rises, all the critical-value functions shift up, or to
the right. Hence, as c/Y increases, areas disappear. This confirms that Figure 3.1 can
be viewed as the general case: as armament costs rise, one by one, equilibrium areas
13α < 1/2⇒ δ∗1K < δ∗1L so that δ1 < δ∗1K ⇒ δ1 < δ∗1L .
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disappear from the (δ1 × δ2)–space. c/Y ≥ max{ρ/α, (1− α)/α} makes δ∗1K , δ∗1L , δ∗2K (1)
and δ∗2L (1) all greater than one, so that only the mutual cooperative equilibrium remains
(cf. Figure 2.3(a)). On the other hand, as c/Y becomes 0, three areas remain: two conflict
areas and one area where the outcome is so far undetermined (for δ1 < δ∗1K ) (cf. Figure
2.3(b)).
Figure 2.3: Limiting cases of Figure 3.1
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Before turning to the analysis of TL and BR, we briefly summarise and discuss the
three core properties of the model presented so far. We also discuss some empirical and
case study evidence on the effects we identified.
First, the robustness coefficients δ1 and δ2 determine the relative attractiveness of the
strategies. Thus, different δ’s lead to different equilibrium strategies. Consider three
economies that only differ in the structure of their productive sector. The first highly
depends on oil extraction or mining (robust resources), the second on tobacco (planta-
tion economy) and the third is a fully diversified economy. Due to the nature of these
economies (cf. Figure 2.1), all other parameter values being equal, it is quite possible that
(FF), (FC) and (CC) are their respective unique equilibria.
Corollary 1. All other parameters being equal, diversified economies will be fully integrated,
robust resource dependent economies will be conflictual and especially plantation economies can
be stratified.
Following an in-depth discussion of thirteen civil wars, Ross [2004, p. 50] concludes
that “resource wealth contributed to the outbreak of conflict in five of the thirteen cases.”
The economy of those five countries relied heavily, if not uniquely, on robust resources.
We associated high values of δ1 and δ2 with such economies, making the (FF) equilibrium
a likely occurrence.
The DRC is a prototype of such a highly mineral-dependent country. Obviously, the
role of scarce resources in the 1998–2003 war and atrocities in the eastern region can
hardly be overestimated. As a UN report14 concludes: “The conflict in the DRC has
14Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the DRC, 12 April 2001, §213.
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become mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral resources: coltan,
diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is appealing and hard to
resist in the context of lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority.” Moreover
the Kahuzi-Biega National Park in South Kivu reportedly hosted 15000 ‘diggers’ in 2002.
Obviously, the production of coltan, a lootable resource, remained profitable throughout
the 6-year war, which indicates that δ1 and δ2 were high in the DRC (Moyroud and
Katunga [2002]).
Sierra Leone provides a striking example of a highly robust resource dependent, yet
conflict-torn country. Alluvial diamond mining has undoubtedly played a prominent
role in (triggering) Sierra Leone’s horrifying war: “The point of the war may not actu-
ally have been to win it, but to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare.
Diamonds, in fact, have fuelled Sierra Leone’s conflict, destabilising the country for the
better part of three decades, stealing its patrimony and robbing an entire generation
of children, putting the country dead last on the UNDP Human Development Index”
(Smillie et al. [2000, p. 1]).
In the Sudan, the discovery of considerable oil reserves, oil being a typical robust re-
source, played a key role. After oil was discovered in 1980, Khartoum reneged on a peace
pact, suggesting at least, that oil revenues provide funds to, for instance, sustain oppres-
sion or fuel rebellion or war (Renner [2002]; Switzer [2002]). Among others, Fearon and
Laitin [2003] and Collier and Hoeffler [2004] find empirical support for the impact of oil
dependence on the onset of civil war.
We associated high values of δ1 and low values of δ2 (low costs of stratification,
high costs of conflict) with plantation economies, economies where capital and labour
intensive (staple) agriculture creates a substantial share of the value added. In such a
society the stratified (FC) equilibrium is more likely to occur. Both the economic history
of western colonisation and the Ante-Bellum South of the United States corroborate this
theoretical result. Rubber, sugar, tea and the likes made up the lion’s share of the total
value created in most of the Colonial economies.15 Not one of these can claim not to
have been a stratified society. The highly cotton-dependent southern US, the so-called
Cotton States, too were characterised by deep segregation.
δ1, δ2 : econometric evidence. Collier and Hoeffler [2004] measure the effect of the
structure of the economy on the risk of civil war outbreak by the ratio of primary
commodity exports to GDP. They find this variable to be highly significant in a non-
monotonous way (an inverted U-shape). Economies with a high ratio are typically re-
source dependent economies, situated more to the right hand side in the δ1 × δ2 plane
(see Figure 2.1), and are, therefore, indeed more characterised by conflict than diversified
and subsistence economies. Others claim that more pertinent variables are required for
the analysis of conflict: Lujala et al. [2005] find that the exploitation of alluvial diamonds
is positively related to the probability of the outbreak and incidence of ethnic conflict;
Fearon [2005] suggests that the risk of primary commodities is confined to oil extraction:
governments extract much larger rents from oil than from other commodities which,
therefore, limits the need for a strong bureaucratic system to raise tax revenues and en-
15Note that in most of the colonial states, with a very small dominant group (very small α), the area
where stratification is an equilibrium is very large.
Civil conflict and its causes 31
genders weaker governments. However, Collier and Hoeffler [2005] find that when both
are included in a regression to explain the onset of civil war, estimated rents are insignif-
icant while the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP remains highly significant.
Humphreys [2005] explicitly tests the importance of the weakness of economic inte-
gration for conflict risks by including the share of agriculture in national income as a
measure of economic structure. He finds it to be positively related to the probability of
the onset of civil war, which confirms one of the predictions of our model: the economies
situated above and to the right of diversified economies in Figure 2.1 have a higher prob-
ability of civil war. In addition, also conform the predictions of our model, he finds that
oil and diamond producing economies (both robust resources) are more conflict-prone
than subsistence and plantation economies.
To summarise, it seems fair to conclude that the results of these econometric studies
corroborate the predictions of our theoretical model. Moreover, in line with the evidence
of Ross’s [2004] analysis of thirteen cases, the aforementioned conflicts demonstrate that
Le Billon’s [2001] typology, in which he lists civil wars and determines the types of
resources that dominate those civil war-plagued countries, completed with lootable re-
sources, is a powerful tool for elucidating the causes of civil conflict.
Second, the private cost of choosing the conflict strategy, c, shapes the parameter space:
low private costs, e.g. c/Y → 0, induce the players to defect or choose the conflict strategy
(cf. Figure 2.3(b)). In contrast, very high private costs (c/Y ≥ max{ρ/α, (1− α)/α}) make
the cooperative strategy more attractive for both players (cf. Figure 2.3(a)). Recall that c
also contains foregone income.
Corollary 2. Higher private costs of conflict increase the area of the parameter space where society
is fully integrated and decrease the area where society is conflictual.
Collier and Hoeffler [2004] propose three proxies for this variable: income per capita,
male secondary school enrolment and the growth rate of the economy, all three measured
prior to the outbreak of conflict. Due to the high correlation between the first two,
they are not included in the same regression as explanatory variables for the risk of
civil war onset. However, each taken separately in a regression which includes lagged
growth is highly significant. The economic and statistical significance of the latter has
been confirmed by, among others, Miguel et al. [2004]. Even though Fearon and Laitin
[2003] view the significance of lagged per capita income as an indicator for weak state
(administrative, police and military) capabilities which induce war, we believe that the
joint significance of the pre-conflict level of per capita income and its rate of growth
provides support for the importance of opportunity costs.16
Finally, ρ plays a noticeable role. Starting from Figure 3.1, with α < ρ, decreasing ρ in-
creases δ∗2K and decreases δ
∗
2L , thereby increasing both the conflictual-society area and the
cooperative-society area. Moreover, this only affects economies with low costs of stratifi-
cation (high δ1), which are the resource dependent economies (see Figure 2.1). Therefore,
16Note that, as was pointed out to us by Jean-Philippe Platteau, through its impact on diversification
and specialisation, growth may also cause a country to relocate within the δ1 × δ2–space. However, since
such diversification and specialisation would be expected to take time to significantly alter the composition
of GDP, we believe that the empirical evidence in Collier and Hoeffler [2004] still provides (albeit partial)
support for the pertinence of opportunity costs of fighting.
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we expect foreign intervention (aimed at shifting the balance of power between ethnic
groups) to occur more frequently in resource dependent economies.17
Corollary 3. Foreign intervention through the manipulation of the balance of power (ρ) is more
effective in robust resource dependent and plantation economies than in diversified and subsistence
economies.
The literature on the effect of outside intervention on the duration of conflict primar-
ily focuses on the effect of interventions after conflict occurs (e.g. Regan [2002], Collier
et al. [2004]). Since ours is a simultaneous game, we analyse the ex ante effects of foreign
intervention.
Case studies provide ample proof of the role interested parties play in civil con-
flicts of, especially, resource dependent economies. Obviously, oil extraction in Sudan
would be impossible without the likes of Chevron (U.S.), Lundin (Sweden), Talisman
(Canada), Petronas (Malaysia) and many others. But, apparently, these multinationals
also played a non-negligible role in the resurgence of conflict. The 1972 ‘Addis Ababa
Agreement,’ by which Southern Sudan was granted considerable autonomy and which
brought about a decade of relative peace, was de facto suspended in 1980, shortly after
extensive oil reserves were discovered around Bentiu, when former president Numeiri
redrew the borders between north and south. He created a new state, Unity State, which
was “allegedly to be shared as an asset for both regions, but in practice brought oil-
producing areas under central government jurisdiction, effectively disenfranchising the
south” (Goldsmith et al. [2002, p. 223]). With or without their knowing, by ‘sponsoring’
the Numeiri government, oil producing companies clearly altered the balance of power
in the Sudan in favour of this government.
Foreign investors’ role in Sierra Leone’s tragedy seemingly differ in kind, but not in
nature and consequences. Just to name one, Branch Energy, a small Canadian mining
firm, introduced the government of Sierra Leone to (Island of Man-registered) security
firm ‘Executive Outcomes.’ The engagement of Executive Outcomes by the government
caused such a shift in the balance of power that within weeks the Revolutionary United
Front (a Sierra Leonean Rebel movement) was pushed back and the major diamond areas
were cleared. Could it be coincidence that shortly hereafter, Branch Energy secured a 25
year lease on Sierra Leonean diamond concessions? (Smillie et al. [2000])
Finally, the history of the DRC since the toppling of former President Mobutu is
probably the most infamous illustration of economically motivated interference and in-
trusion by foreign governments and corporations. From the start of his invasion in Zaire
in 1996, Laurent Kabila managed to raise funds for his military operations by granting
“lucrative contracts in the east of the DRC” (Montague [2002, pp. 106–110]). Apparently,
although he was just a rebel leader and in control of only a small part of the country,
Uganda, Rwanda and many international corporations had their bets on Laurent Kabila.
Executives of, among others, Bechtel Corporations, American Mineral Fields, De Beers
Consolidated Mines Ltd. ‘formed outright alliances with the AFDL,’18 providing satellite
studies, infra-red maps, the use of a private jet, etc. Their betting on Kabila obviously
affected the balance of power in his favour.
17In Schollaert and Van de gaer [2008] we focus on the impact of foreign interested parties.
18AFDL is the ‘Alliance des Forces De´mocratiques pour la Libe´ration du Congo.’
Civil conflict and its causes 33
2.4 Strategic Behaviour with Exogenous Trust
In this section we have a closer look at the impact of trust on the strategy-choice in
the two areas in which eliminating dominated strategies does not generate a unique
equilibrium: TL and BR.
The strategy-choice depends on the expected utility of both strategies. When neither
player has a dominated strategy, players use their probability beliefs on the opponent’s
willingness to cooperate to assess the expected utility of their own strategies. This way,
what we call ‘inter-group trust’ enters the analysis. ‘Trust,’ in our model, is the belief one
player has about the other player’s probability of choosing strategy C, i.e., the degree to
which a player is confident that the other player will be cooperative. Trust is, therefore,
defined in a same way as in Wood [2003].
We define ueK(C, ·) as player K’s expected utility of cooperating and ueK(F, ·) as his
expected utility of fighting:19{
ueK(C, ·) = pieLCuK(C,C) + (1− pieLC)uK(C, F),
ueK(F, ·) = pieLCuK(F,C) + (1− pieLC)uK(F, F),
where pieLC is player K’s expectation of the probability that L will cooperate.
Solving the equation ueK(C, ·) = ueK(F, ·) shows that player K will be indifferent to his
two strategies for:
pieLC = pi
∗
LC =
ρδ1δ2 − α(c/Y)
ρδ1δ2 − (δ1 − α) . (2.5)
pieKC is defined similarly. Note that pi
∗
LC and pi
∗
KC are equal to the Nash equilibrium belief
of player L, resp. K, in mixed strategies and that pi∗LC and pi
∗
KC only take values between
zero and one within the TL and BR–areas.
Rearranging terms and expressing the equation for pi∗LC in terms of utility yields:
pi∗LC
[
uK(C,C)− uK(F,C)
]
+ (1− pi∗LC)
[
uK(C, F)− uK(F, F)
]
= 0. (2.6)
With expectations equal to pi∗LC , we can interpret the first term in Equation (2.6),
pi∗LC [uK(C,C) − uK(F,C)], as ‘the expected advantage of cooperating when the other
player cooperates’ and the second term, (1− pi∗LC)[uK(C, F)− uK(F, F)], as ‘the expected
advantage of cooperating when the other player fights.’
In the TL area [uK(C,C) − uK(F,C)], henceforth ACC, is positive and [uK(C, F) −
uK(F, F)], henceforth ACF, is negative. Note that
ueK(C, ·) ≥ (≤) ueK(F, ·) ⇔ pieLCACC + (1− pieLC)ACF ≥ (≤) 0. (2.7)
Therefore, if e.g. pieLC > pi
∗
LC , the weight of the positive term in (2.7) is larger than in (2.6)
and the weight of the negative term is smaller and, consequently, pieLCA
CC +(1−pieLC)ACF
is positive. As a result, K will cooperate if his level of trust is above the critical level pi∗LC .
Other cases can be established similarly, yielding:
19Since the analysis for both players is analogous, we only consider player K from now on.
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Proposition 2. Importance of trust:
. If δ1 < δ∗1K and δ2 > δ
∗
2L(δ1), then,
(a) if pieLC > pi
∗
LC and pi
e
KC > pi
∗
KC , society will be fully integrated;
(b) if pieLC > pi
∗
LC and pi
e
KC < pi
∗
KC , L will dominate in a stratified economy;
(c) if pieLC < pi
∗
LC and pi
e
KC > pi
∗
KC , K will dominate in a stratified economy;
(d) if pieLC < pi
∗
LC and pi
e
KC < pi
∗
KC , society will be conflictual.
. If δ1 > δ∗1L and δ2 < δ
∗
2K(δ1), the inequalities in the antecedents of (a), (b), (c) and (d) have
to be reversed.
Combining Proposition 1 and 2 allows us to characterise a unique equilibrium for
each area in Figure 3.1, for different values of pieLC and pi
e
KC . Figure 2.4 shows four panels:
panel (a), with trustful exogenous beliefs from both groups, panel (d) in which both have
suspicious beliefs, and panel (b) and (c) showing one trustful and one suspicious player.
Note, first, that when elimination of dominated strategies fails to generate a unique
equilibrium, the unique equilibrium of the game is determined by the levels of trust
players have in each others’ willingness to cooperate. Obviously, this shows that if trust
can be measured, the equilibrium of our model is determined. Furthermore, Proposition
2 asserts that the level of trustfulness has opposite implications in the TL and BR–area. A
priori, one might expect that the cooperative equilibrium arises when both groups have
trustful beliefs. This, however, is only true in the TL–area. The high value of δ1 in the
BR–area means that, if the other player cooperates, not much damage is done when K
fights, so that the expected advantage of cooperating when the other player cooperates
is negative. The low value of δ2 implies that a lot of damage is done when K fights if the
other player fights, so that the expected advantage of cooperating when the other player
fights is positive. The trustful attitude of K means that K will consider it very likely that
L cooperates, so that the negative term dominates and he decides not to cooperate. Put
differently, in BR payoffs are such that a high trust in the cooperative nature of the other
agent induces an attempt to capture the entire surplus for the own group. However, if
both act this way, society will be conflictual instead of stratified.
Our model shows that trust manipulation will only be effective in areas where neither
player has a dominated strategy: trust only matters within TL and BR.
Corollary 4. Manipulation of trust can only be effective in subsistence and plantation economies.
We believe that civil conflicts in typical plantation economies (BR) like, among others,
Coˆte d’Ivoire (cocoa) and Sri Lanka (rice; rubber; tea); and in predominantly subsistent
economies (TL) like Burundi and Rwanda, provide this result with tragic ‘case support.’
Apparently, trust manipulation, or as Horowitz [1985] calls it, ‘ethnic outbidding’ espe-
cially strikes subsistence and plantation economies.
To illustrate the mechanism through which the manipulation of trust may change a
society, we discuss the Rwandan case in more detail. It should be noted, however, that
we do not claim to provide a unique or comprehensive explanation for the 1994 genocide
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Figure 2.4: Types of equilibria with exogenous trust
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in Rwanda. Clearly, the impact of decreasing opportunity costs of fighting20 (probably
among many other factors) should not be underestimated. The ensuing discussion, in
other words, only aims to demonstrate how the manipulation of trust may have added
to the disastrous polarisation of the Rwandan society.
The Rwandan society in the run-up to the ’94 genocide allows us to illustrate the
embittering impact of inter-ethnic distrust in the context of our model. With its densely
populated economy depending on subsistence farming, small-scale coffee production
and local trade, it is reasonable to assume that Rwanda was indeed in a region where
trust determined the outcome of the game (Le Billon [2001]; Andre´ and Platteau [1998];
Uvin [1996]), i.c. the TL–region (Rw in Figure 2.4). Prior to the eruption of civil conflict
(Figure 2.4(a): pieLC > pi
∗
LC and pi
e
KC > pi
∗
KC ), economic regress (due to population growth
and widespread misallocation of resources) threatened the ruling classes (here, the large
group L: the Hutus). In order to maintain their privileged position and to divert popular
20With too few non-agricultural income opportunities and limited possibilities of emigration, it is very
likely that the Malthusian trap in which Rwanda was caught (Andre´ and Platteau [1998]) significantly
decreased the opportunity costs of fighting. See Section 2.3 for a discussion of the role of the opportunity
costs of fighting (c/Y) in this model.
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discontent, the ruling regimes resorted to “the revival of ethnic hatred” (Uvin [1997,
p. 109]). Extremist and racist discourse at political meetings and through the media
(Rwanda, Media Case [2004])21 were not only tolerated, but actively supported by the
ruling elite who tried (and managed) to manipulate trust among ethnic groups: Hutus’
expectation on the trustworthiness of the Tutsis, pieKC , decreased and eventually got below
pi∗KC . Fighting became the utility maximising strategy for the Hutus: Rwanda moved from
panel 2.4(a) to panel 2.4(b). Thus, hateful propaganda against a certain ethnic group
clearly served as an ultimate “tool for power to the elite” (Uvin [1997, p. 109]). Hence, by
undermining trust, active and purposeful ethnic polarisation is likely to have been the
spark that initially triggered aggressive repression: the Hutu trust-level was insufficient
to sustain a cooperative equilibrium. A similar argument rationalises the transition from
repression to outright civil war: a downwards shift (below pi∗LC ) in Tutsi belief in the
cooperative behaviour of the Hutus took Rwanda from panel 2.4(b) to panel 2.4(d). Then,
Kofi Annan’s public condemning of “the use of hate media which is fuelling the tensions,
xenophobia and inciting violent acts”22 asserts the importance of trust manipulation.
2.5 Conclusions
Our model considers societies populated by two identifiable groups. National income
is assumed to be optimised when group behaviour is unaffected by social affiliation.
If, on the contrary, agents preferably or solely interact with agents of the same group,
this is assumed to be costly and to limit a country’s economic potential. If both groups
claim a favourable treatment in the assignment of value added, internal conflict results
and national income shrinks even more. Furthermore, we assume that the opportunity
costs of choosing a non-cooperative strategy are determined by the type of economic
activity that creates value added in a country: (i) limited interaction restrains economic
output to a lesser extent in natural resource dependent and plantation economies than
in diversified or heterogeneous subsistent economies; and (ii) societal costs of war are
smaller for robust resource dependent and subsistent economies than for plantation and
diversified economies.
We characterise the equilibrium-strategies by eliminating dominated strategies. We
show that: (i) robust resource dependent economies are particularly prone to conflict,
more so than subsistent and diversified economies, due to the low societal costs of strati-
fication and war; (ii) foreign intervention, by manipulating the balance of power between
groups, is more effective in resource dependent economies; (iii) manipulating trust will
only be effective in subsistence and plantation economies; and (iv) plantation economies
tend to be stratified. We reported case study and econometric evidence corroborating
these results.
In our model, therefore, ethnic diversity might indeed appear as a curse: since many
of the war-torn countries highly depend on the exploitation of natural resources, and
21Comments on ‘Case No. ICTR-99-52-T’: “The United Nations established the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda to hold accountable the persons most responsible for Rwanda’s three-month genocide
. . . [T]he founder [. . . ] of [. . . ] an extremist newspaper that published pieces ‘brimming’ with ‘contempt
and hatred for the Tutsi ethnic group,’ sometimes “calling for the extermination of the Tutsis.”
22New York, 11 November 2004 – Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General.
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since this type of economic activity is characterised by a low opportunity cost of fighting,
cooperating might not be an equilibrium strategy among identifiable groups. However,
we show that rather than originating from ethnic sentiments or deeply set hatred, the
apparently ‘ethnic’ conflict serves as a convenient excuse which hides economic motives
(Mueller [2000]): with high natural (robust) resource dependence it proves to be a utility-
maximising and equilibrium strategy to let ethnic affiliation guide economic interaction.

3HOW TO PREVENT CONFL ICT
With Dirk Van de gaer
3.1 Introduction
That social stratification and civil strife are economically pernicious is beyond doubt.
Some scholars even claim that they constitute two of the core obstacles to the economic
take-off of developing countries (Azam et al. [2001], Murdoch and Sandler [2002]). Con-
flict prevention constitutes, therefore, a natural first step in foreign assistance to third-
world development. Surprisingly, scholarly attention has primarily focused on ex-post
third-party intervention,1 i.e. after a conflict has emerged. In contrast, our focus is ex
ante: how to prevent conflict and stimulate cooperation by outside intervention taken
before the players choose their strategies.
This paper presents a game-theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of different types
of third-party intervention in preventing social stratification or civil conflict. Society is
assumed to be composed of two (identifiable/ethnic) groups that decide to cooperate,
i.e. to accept a group neutral allocation of value added, or to fight, i.e. to invest in arms
and claim a preferential treatment of group members in the allocation of value added.
We study whether third-party intervention can induce a Bayesian Nash (BN) equilibrium
where both groups choose the cooperative strategy (‘cooperative equilibrium’) and dis-
courage a BN equilibrium where both choose to fight (‘fighting equilibrium’). We think
of third-party or outside intervention as international and coordinated intervention as it
would, for example, be implemented by the United Nations. We will, therefore, use ‘the
UN’ as a metaphor for all types of internationally coordinated intervention.
We consider three types of policies for the UN. A first policy is a credible threat by
the UN to punish the country through a boycott of its international trade. We analyse
the effectiveness of two different types of boycott. The first type hits the country as soon
as one of the parties chooses a fighting strategy by investing in arms and appropriating
the value added of the economy. We call this a ‘strong’ boycott. The second type only
punishes mutual fighting: it is implemented when both parties invest in arms and claim
the country’s riches, leading to a civil war. This type of boycott will be referred to as the
‘weak’ boycott. A second policy is power politics, by which the balance of power between
groups in the case of conflict is altered before players choose their strategies (cf. Porsholt
[1966]). Finally, before players choose their strategies, the UN can try to reinforce trust
between the parties by enacting trust building policies (cf. Kydd [2000]).
In modelling terms, this boils down to the following. Boycotts decrease the value
added that can be distributed among groups. The strong boycott decreases this value
added as soon as one of the groups chooses the fighting strategy and a weak boycott leads
to a decrease in value added only if both groups choose to fight. Power politics influences
the probability that a group wins in case of full conflict. Finally, to model the effect of
1See, among others, Betts [1994], Mandell [1996], Regan [1996, 1998], Doyle and Sambanis [2000], Boyce
[2002].
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trust building, we formulate our game as a game with two groups under imperfect
information. A group is either of the opportunistic type whose strategy depends on its
payoffs, or of the good type who always cooperates. Groups are informed about their
own type, but they are uncertain about the type of the other group. Trust building
policies attempt to increase the beliefs that the other group is of the good type.
We find the following. A strong boycott can always ensure that the cooperative equi-
librium is the only equilibrium. Consequently, it can preclude the fighting equilibrium
without any restriction on the costs of fighting. Neither the weak boycott, power politics
nor trust building has the potential to induce the cooperative equilibrium. For a certain
range of parameter values, however, they can turn a situation with multiple equilibria (a
cooperative, a fighting and a mixed strategy equilibrium) into one where the cooperative
equilibrium is unique. Furthermore, under certain restrictions on the costs of fighting,
they can rule out the fighting equilibrium. The restrictions are the same for weak boy-
cotts and power politics and can be lower for trust manipulation for certain economies.
Furthermore, the impact of boycotts is much easier to predict than that of power politics
and trust building and when using the latter two to prevent the fighting equilibrium, the
UN might have to decide which group to favour at the expense of the other group.
In analysing the effects of the four types of intervention we ignore the problem of
implementation. Boycotts are only effective if implemented by an important fraction of
the (potential) trading partners. Every individual country, however, has an incentive to
free-ride. Consequently, boycotts of countries are often circumvented, it might be chal-
lenging to enforce a boycott effectively. For example, in a very original study, DellaVigna
and La Ferrara [2008] provide convincing evidence for both the effectiveness and the in-
effectiveness of weapon embargoes: they show that weapon embargoes are only effective
where weapon-making firms face high legal and reputational costs. Manipulating trust
is not straightforward either. For instance, using a signalling game, Leeson [2007] shows
that state-imposed homogeneity in behaviour may reduce the possibility to signal trust-
worthiness by investing in creating homogeneity with outsiders and, therefore, hamper
mutually advantageous trade between groups. Furthermore, changing the balance of
power in conflicts might be very hard too. There are several cases in which private firms
or individual countries sponsor certain factions in exchange for lucrative contracts when
the faction rises to power (Smillie et al. [2000]; Montague [2002]; Samset [2002]). We
argue elsewhere (Schollaert and Van de gaer [2008]) that for certain types of economies
these private incentives can be substantial. Such action might, evidently, counter UN
efforts. The question we ask ignores these issues of implementation: we analyse the ef-
fectiveness of different types of intervention in the absence of such problems. Evidently,
in reality there may well be a trade-off between effectiveness and implementability.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents the core assumptions of the
model and calculates players’ (expected) payoffs. Section 3.3 develops the theoretical
model and Section 3.4 conducts a technical analysis of the respective types of inter-
vention. In Section 3.5 intervention tools are compared in terms of effectiveness and
straightforwardness and Section 4.7 presents conclusions.
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3.2 Assumptions and payoffs
Let the population be split into two groups, K and L, with α and (1− α) their respective
population share. Without loss of generality, we assume that group K is not larger than
group L: 0 < α ≤ 1/2. We follow Hirshleifer [1995] and exclude the within-group
coordination and free-riding problem.2
The economy has two sectors: a productive sector and a subsistence sector. The pro-
ductive sector is the part of the economy that creates a high value added (mining, trade,
services), while small-scale agriculture or traditional trades are typical subsistence activ-
ities. We normalise the value created in the subsistence sector at zero, so that national
income per capita equals the value created by the productive sector, Y. The issue at stake
is the division of the value added created in the economy between the two population
groups. One could easily think of several mechanisms through which this could occur:
taxing all value added and distributing it among own group members, employing only
group members in the productive sector (possibly combined with taxes or subsidies in
order to serve all group members), etc. We leave the mechanism through which it occurs
open.
We consider a two stage game.3 In the first stage, groups have the following strategy
space: either they choose to cooperate (C) with the other group, or they choose to fight
(F). The cooperative strategy means that the group does not claim any preferential
treatment in the division of value added. The fighting strategy means that a group aims
at a preferential treatment of its members. We will, furthermore, assume that if a player
is indifferent between cooperating and fighting, i.e. if his expected utility of cooperating
equals his expected utility of fighting, he will choose to cooperate.
Groups can be of two types: they can be good or opportunistic. The former always
plays C. The strategy of the latter depends on its pay-off. First nature decides to which
type each group belongs and groups only know their own type with certainty. This
information is used to form piLg and piKg , respectively group K’s and group L’s belief that
the other group is of the good type, after their own type has been revealed. A higher
value of piLg (piKg ) means that group K (L) has more trust in the cooperativeness of group
L. Trust building policies attempt to influence piLg and piKg . Denote by piLc|o (pi
K
c|o) player
K’s belief that L (K) will be cooperative if he is of the opportunistic type, while pLc|o (p
K
c|o)
is the actual probability that L (K) will be cooperative if he is of the opportunistic type.
After the groups decide their strategy, the game enters its second stage in which the
value added will be distributed. We keep this stage as simple as possible. If both groups
cooperate, the value added will be allocated equally over the population and everybody
receives Y. When only one group decides to fight, this group becomes dominant4 and
divides the value added among its members, leaving nothing for the other group. To
2As Robinson [2001, p. 86] puts it, “in reality individuals act not purely in isolation, but also as part of
larger social groupings and networks.” In order to focus on the problem of group interaction, we assume
that the social control within each group is sufficiently effective to overcome the free-riding problem. The
high level of social control within ethnic groups is often the reason why the fight for resources occurs along
‘ethnic’ lines (Gates [2002]).
3For a dynamic analysis of conflicting activities, see Maxwell and Reuveny [2005].
4Dominance reflects the situation in which one group manages to seize political and economic power.
In the present context this means that the dominant group is in control and appropriates the value added.
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resolve the conflict when both choose strategy F, we include an exogenous variable ρ
(resp. [1 − ρ]) that reflects the probability that the members of group K (resp. L) will
manage to ‘capture’ the value added. ρ can be interpreted as a measure of relative power
of group K, and allows for different interpretations (Neary [1997, p. 483]). It “might be
a negotiated division of the stock that takes into account the relative arms levels or it
might be the outcome of a winner-take-all contest, where [ρ is player K’s] probability of
winning.”
As a result of the choices made by the groups, there are four potential outcomes of
the game: (C,C), the fully integrated society, when both choose to cooperate; (F,C), a
stratified society where K dominates, when K fights while L cooperates; (C, F) when the
reverse holds and (F, F), a conflictual society, when both choose not to cooperate. Note
that, in contrast to all of the literature, we have asymmetric equilibria (stratified societies)
which reveal important dilemmas for the UN.
There are two types of cost that are associated with fighting and conflict. First, there
is a private cost of choosing the fighting strategy. To implement preferential treatment in
the second stage, a group needs to be able to enforce it. This can be done by purchasing
arms, which entails a private cost for each member of the group equal to c > 0. In the
economic literature on conflict (e.g., Hirshleifer [1991, 1995], Skaperdas [1992] and Neary
[1997]) it is usually assumed that a group’s probability of winning the conflict depends
on the arms expenditures of the groups. In our model a comparable mechanism could
be introduced by, for example, relating ρ to the size of the group, α. However, we choose
to keep ρ exogenous, for ρ is an obvious channel through which power politics can alter
the outcome of the game. UN intervention can change relative power, which influences
the strategies chosen by the groups and thereby the nature of the resulting society. In
Figure 3.2 we depict the case where ρ = α, which is the case where a group’s power is
proportional to its size and total arms expenditure by the group members.
Second, there are societal costs associated with a stratified or conflict society. In a
stratified society, the per capita value created by the productive sector (and thus national
income) is reduced to δ1Y, with 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1. The robustness coefficient δ1 is inversely
related to several types of costs, such as costs due to the misallocation of resources (less
trade, misallocation of talent), the negative incentive effects of nepotism and discrimi-
nation, the impact of antagonism between groups on the over-exploitation of common
resources and a diminished social capital stock.5 In a conflict society, costs will be even
higher since this situation leads to a disruption of all economic activity and a destruc-
tion of infrastructure.6 These additional costs lower per capita national income to δ1δ2Y
with 0 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1. The magnitude of societal costs of stratification and conflict crucially
depends on the kind of economic activity that generates high value added. Activities
directed at the exploitation of geographically concentrated primary resources such as
mining, or economies heavily dependent on lootable resources, are not much affected.
Only a limited number of transport links are needed to operate them. Service industries
and trade are much more vulnerable to stratification and war.7 We model the boycotts as
5The idea is similar to the argument made by Leeson [2005, p. 76]: “Non-fractionalized agents are able
to reap the benefits from trade despite being socially distant. Fractionalized agents, in contrast, are unable
to do so and instead interact predominantly with those they are very close to and thus know very well.”
6Hirshleifer [1988, p. 205] calls it battle damage.
7See Schollaert and Van de gaer [2008] for a detailed discussion on how the structure of the economy
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exogenous decreases in the robustness coefficients. Hence, the boycott-free values of δ1
and δ2 are determined by the structure of a country’s economic activity; a strong boycott
decreases δ1 and a weak boycott decreases δ2 below its boycott-free level.
Straightforward calculation shows that individual payoffs are:8
(L)
C F
C Y (Y) 0
(
1
(1−α) δ1Y− c
)
K
F 1α δ1Y− c (0) ρα δ1δ2Y− c
(
(1−ρ)
(1−α) δ1δ2Y− c
)
To solve our game with imperfect information, we compute the BN equilibria of the
game. A BN equilibrium consists of probability beliefs (piLc|o,pi
K
c|o) over strategy C and
probabilities (pLc|o, p
K
c|o) of choosing strategy C so that (i) given his beliefs, player L (K)
chooses pLc|o (p
K
c|o) so that his expected utility is maximised and (ii) the beliefs are correct:
pLc|o = pi
L
c|o and p
K
c|o = pi
K
c|o. Next, we characterise the BN equilibria.
3.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibria
We analyse the effects of boycotts, beliefs and changes in relative power by partitioning
the δ1 × δ2–space (with δ1 × δ2 ⊆ [0, 1]2) in different sections that correspond to different
types of societies. This immediately shows the effects of a boycott. Given the structure
of its economy, a country has a particular value of δ1 and δ2. Strong and weak boycotts
respectively decrease δ1 and δ2 below this value. In Definition 1 we define critical value
functions that partition the δ1× δ2–space and determine the BN equilibria of the game as
shown in Theorem 1.9 We delete the arguments of the functions in most of the discussion
to simplify the notation.
Definition 1. Critical value functions:
δ1,K
(
α, cY
) ≡ α (1+ cY ).
δ1,L
(
α, cY
) ≡ (1− α) (1+ cY ).
δ2,K
(
δ1, α, ρ, cY ,pi
L
g
)
≡ − pi
L
g
(1−piLg )ρ +
α
(1−piLg )ρδ1
[
piLg +
c
Y
]
.
δ2,L
(
δ1, α, ρ, cY ,pi
K
g
)
≡ − pi
K
g
(1−piKg )(1−ρ) +
(1−α)
(1−piKg )(1−ρ)δ1
[
piKg +
c
Y
]
.
Figure 3.1 describes a general parameter configuration and depicts the critical value
functions.10 The δ1,K– and δ1,L–curves are vertical in the δ1× δ2–space. The δ2,K– and δ2,L–
curves are decreasing and convex with respect to δ1. As stated in Section 3.2, without loss
relates to the societal costs of conflict.
8By assuming that individuals’ utility functions are linear in income, we assume that they are risk
neutral.
9The critical value functions in Definition 1 are derived in the Proof of Theorem 1.
10We call Figure 3.1 a ‘generic case’ because it demonstrates all the riches of the model: it contains all
the different kinds of equilibrium areas that might occur for the range of parameter values.
44 Ch. 3. How to prevent conflict
Figure 3.1: Generic case
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of generality, we focus on the case where α ≤ 1/2 such that δ1,K ≤ δ1,L. Both the δ1,K–
and δ2,K–curves and the δ1,L– and δ2,L–curves cross each other in the positive orthant,
respectively in δ∗K = (α[1+
c
Y ],
1
ρ
c
c+Y ) and δ
∗
L = ((1− α)[1+ cY ], 11−ρ cc+Y ). Finally, note
that the δ2,K– and δ2,L–curve cross at most once.
We next characterise the BN equilibria of the game with two opportunistic players.
Theorem 1. BN equilibria :
(a) The BN equilibria in pure strategies result in the following kinds of societies:
(C,C)⇔ δ1 ≤ δ1,K and δ1 ≤ δ1,L, (C, F)⇔ δ2 ≤ δ2,K and δ1 > δ1,L,
(F,C)⇔ δ1 > δ1,K and δ2 ≤ δ2,L, (F, F)⇔ δ2 > δ2,K and δ2 > δ2,L.
(b) BN equilibria in mixed strategies occur when the following conditions hold simultaneously:
1. For player K: either
(i) δ1 > δ1,K AND δ2 < δ2,K; or
(ii) δ1 < δ1,K AND δ2 > δ2,K.
2. For player L: either
(i) δ1 > δ1,L AND δ2 < δ2,L; or
(ii) δ1 < δ1,L AND δ2 > δ2,L.
The equilibrium probabilities are then given by:
pLc|o =
1
(1− piLg )
[
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
α− δ1 + ρδ1δ2 − pi
L
g
]
;
and
pKc|o =
1
(1− piKg )
[
(1− ρ)δ1δ2 − (1− α) cY
(1− α)− δ1 + (1− ρ)δ1δ2 − pi
K
g
]
.
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Intuition for the conditions of the pure strategy equilibria. For values of δ1 ≤ δ1,K,
given that L cooperates, cooperating is player K’s best response. Similarly, the inequality
δ1 ≤ δ1,L determines the values of δ1 for which the expected utility of cooperating for
player L is larger than the expected utility of fighting, given that K cooperates. The (C,C)
equilibrium arises when both players cooperate given that the other player cooperates
(compatibility of their optimising decisions) and thus when δ1 ≤ δ1,K and δ1 ≤ δ1,L.
In Figure 3.1 this occur in the area e0 f g. Similarly, for values of δ2 ≤ δ2,L the expected
utility of cooperating for player L is larger than of fighting, given that K fights. The (F,C)
equilibrium then occurs when player K fights given that L cooperates and L cooperates
given that K fights. From the above, this occurs when δ1 > δ1,K and δ2 ≤ δ2,L, area h f i.
The intuition for the other pure strategy equilibria can be derived analogously: (F, F)
occurs in area abcd, (C, F) in jklc.
Intuition for the equilibrium probabilities of the mixed strategy equilibria. In a
mixed strategy equilibrium the equilibrium probabilities equate the expected utility of
cooperation to the expected utility of fighting. Since (1− piLg )(1− pLc|o) is the probabil-
ity that L fights and
[
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
]
is the utility advantage for player K of fighting over
cooperating if L fights, and
[
piLg + (1− piLg )pLc|o
]
is the probability that L cooperates and[
α− δ1 + α cY
]
is the utility advantage for player K of fighting over cooperating if L coop-
erates, we get:[
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
]
(1− piLg )(1− pLc|o)−
[
α− δ1 + α cY
] [
piLg + (1− piLg )pLc|o
]
= 0. (3.1)
Solving this expression for pLc|o results in the expression given in Theorem 1, part (b). p
K
c|o
can be derived from equating the expected utility of cooperating to the expected utility
of fighting for player L.
Corollary 5 shows that there are three types of areas with BN equilibria in mixed
strategies.
Corollary 5. Types of areas with mixed strategy equilibria :
(a) Area with mixed strategy equilibria and pure strategy equilibria of type (C,C) and (F, F).
(b) Area with mixed strategy equilibria and pure strategy equilibria of type (F,C) and (C, F).
(c) Areas in which the mixed strategy equilibrium is the only equilibrium. This occurs when
conditions 1 (i) and 2 (ii) of part (b) of Theorem 1 hold true.
It is straightforward to find the types of mixed strategy equilibria in Figure 3.1. (a)
coincides with area ahg, (b) with area δ∗Lki and (c) with area bδ
∗
L j.
In the cases where the BN equilibrium is of type (a) or (b), there are three different
BN equilibria: one in mixed strategies and two in pure strategies. For some parameter
configurations no equilibria in pure strategies exist. All finite games, however, have a
Nash equilibrium: when no pure strategy equilibria exist, the Nash equilibrium will be
of type (c).
Obviously, not all the areas in Figure 3.1 occur for all possible parameter configu-
rations. Which areas occur, depends on the position of the δ∗H’s and on whether their
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coordinates are between 0 and 1. This, in turn, crucially depends on the value of c/Y.
As c/Y increases, the δ1,K– and δ1,L–curves shift to the right and the δ2,K– and δ2,L–curves
shift up, thus potentially excluding some equilibrium areas.11
3.4 UN intervention
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of policy intervention. The three policy tools
affect the game in distinct ways. We first study their effects on the equilibrium probabil-
ities in mixed strategy equilibria and then their effect on the pure strategy equilibria.
Effect on the equilibrium probabilities in mixed strategy equilibria
In the mixed BN equilibrium areas, UN intervention has an impact on the players’ prob-
ability of cooperating. Due to the closed form expressions we derived in Theorem 1,
the comparative static analysis of this impact is relatively straightforward. Corollary 6
summarises the results. Entry ‘− (x)’ in the table of Corollary 6(a) means that the cor-
responding probability decreases if the mixed strategy equilibrium area is of type (x),
with x = a, b or c, as defined in Corollary 5. An entry ‘+ (x)’ means that the probability
increases.
Corollary 6. Mixed strategy equilibria and UN intervention:
(a) The effect of boycotts and power politics on the probability that players cooperate depends
on the type of mixed strategy equilibrium area. In particular:
pLc|o p
K
c|o
strong boycott − (a) + (b) and (c) − (a) and (c) + (b)
weak boycott − (a) + (b) and (c) − (a) and (c) + (b)
increase in ρ + (a) − (b) and (c) − (a) and (c) + (b)
(b) An increased belief that the other player is of the good type decreases the probability that a
player will cooperate.
Part (a) of Corollary 6 shows that boycotts enhance cooperation only in mixed strat-
egy equilibria of type (b). When the mixed strategy equilibrium is of type (a), they
make cooperation less likely. Hence, to predict the effects of boycotts in mixed strategy
equilibria, the type of mixed strategy equilibrium matters. Power politics only enhance
cooperation unambiguously if the economy is in a mixed strategy equilibrium of type
(c). In that case, decreasing the power of the smallest group increases the probability
that both groups cooperate. In other types of mixed strategy equilibria, power politics
increases the probability that one group cooperates, but decreases the probability that
the other group cooperates. Consequently, since the parameter values of the economy
11Note that increasing c/Y (e.g. by increasing the costs of armament) would be an effective policy tool.
We don’t consider it here, however, because within our model it generates trivial conclusions. Moreover,
when small farming tools can serve as weapons, the feasibility of manipulating the costs of armament
becomes highly questionable.
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determine the type of mixed strategy equilibrium that might occur, to predict the effects
of boycotts and power politics, we need to know these values. We say that their effects
are context-specific.
Part (b) shows that an increased belief that the other player is of the good type
decreases the probability that a player cooperates. The reason is that, if the other player
cooperates, it is possible to gain by fighting. If a player’s belief that the other one is of the
good type increases, the expected gains from fighting increase, inducing him to decrease
the probability of cooperation. Put differently: it pays to take advantage of the believed
trustworthiness of the other player. This is an important conclusion: in areas where
mixed strategy equilibria occur, trust building decreases the probability that players opt
for a cooperative strategy.
Policy Implication 1. (Mixed strategy equilibria) The effect of boycotts and power politics on
mixed strategy equilibria is context-specific. Trust building decreases the probability that players
choose a cooperative strategy.
Effect on the pure strategy equilibria
Since the effect of boycotts are readily seen from Figure 3.1, while the effects of power
politics and trust building require further analysis, we deal with these instruments in
separate sections.
Boycotts
The partitioning of the δ1 × δ2–space allows for a straightforward analysis of the effects
of boycotts on the BN equilibria in pure strategies. Boycotts sanctioning any deviation
from cooperation (strong boycotts) lower δ1, boycotts sanctioning only when both players
fight (weak boycotts) lower δ2. Since δ1,L > δ1,K > 0, strong boycotts can always induce a
(C,C) equilibrium by decreasing δ1. Moreover, since δ2,K and δ2,L are strictly positive for
all δ1 > 0, if strong enough, strong boycotts can guarantee that the (C,C) equilibrium
in pure strategies is the unique equilibrium. Due to the vertical orientation of δ1,K, weak
boycotts are only effective in turning a mixed strategy equilibrium of type (a) into a
(C,C) equilibrium; i.e. when, left of δ1,K, we force the economy below δ2,L, we make
cooperating the dominant strategy for player L and, therefore (again: left of δ1,K) also for
player K.
Policy Implication 2. While strong boycotts can always induce that a cooperative equilibrium
is the only equilibrium, weak boycotts can only do so if the economy was originally in a mixed
strategy equilibrium of type (a).
Power politics and trust building
The position of the δ1,K–curve is independent of relative power (ρ) and respective levels
of trust (piLg and piKg ). Therefore, these policies can never expand the CC–area in Figure
3.1. Yet, ρ and piLg and piKg determine the size of the other equilibrium areas by shaping
the course of the δ2,H–curves. Lemma 1 lists how δ2,K and δ2,L are affected by changes in
power and trust.
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Lemma 1. Comparative static properties of δ2,H. An increase in:
− piLg rotates the δ2,K–curve clockwise through the point δ∗K;
− piKg rotates the δ2,L–curve clockwise through the point δ∗L;
− ρ rotates the δ2,K–curve counter-clockwise through the point
(
α
[
1+ 1
piLg
c
Y
]
, 0
)
;12
− ρ rotates the δ2,L–curve clockwise through the point
(
(1− α)
[
1+ 1
piKg
c
Y
]
, 0
)
;12
− ρ shifts δ∗K vertically down;
− ρ shifts δ∗L vertically up.
For economies in a type (a) area with three equilibria (Corollary 5) power politics and
trust manipulation can, by affecting the position of the δ2,H–curves, change the equilib-
rium of the game in such a way that the only remaining BN equilibrium is the cooperative
equilibrium. In the generic case of Figure 3.1, this can be achieved by increasing ρ or piKg ,
or by increasing piLg substantially, i.e. such that the δ2,K–curve lies above the δ2,L–curve.
However, for economies in other areas these policy measures can have undesirable ef-
fects. Consider for instance economies in the area jδ∗Lilc of the generic case in Figure 3.1.
Increasing piLg , by rotating the δ2,K–curve clockwise through the point δ∗K has the perverse
effect of turning some of the (C, F) equilibria into an (F, F) equilibrium. An increase
in ρ, by rotating the δ2,K–curve counter-clockwise through the point (α[1+ c/(piLgY)], 0)
will have the same consequences. In Figure 3.1, only piKg has no perverse effects on the
pure strategy equilibrium areas. However, the positions of the δ2,K–curve and δ2,L–curve
within the generic case described in Figure 3.1, are a particular case. It is, for instance,
possible that δ2,L lies entirely above the δ2,K (cf. Figure 3.2, proportional power). Here,
Figure 3.2: Proportional power
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Figure 3.3: Special case
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12Note that this is a point on the horizontal axis that may lie outside of the δ1 × δ2–space.
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an increase in piKg rotates the δ2,L–curve clockwise through the point δ∗L and turns some
(C, F) equilibria in an (F, F) equilibrium.
Alternatively, for example, the δ2,K–curve could be steeper than the δ2,L–curve, as
shown in Figure 3.3. Here, contrary to the generic case in Figure 3.1, to reduce the
three BN equilibria to a unique cooperating equilibrium, ρ has to be decreased. These
two ‘special cases’ (figures 3.2 and 3.3) show that the effects of power politics and trust
manipulation on the pure strategy equilibria are context-specific.
Policy Implication 3. Power politics and trust manipulation can only ensure that the coopera-
tive equilibrium is unique for economies located in the area of type (a), described in Corollary 5.
By doing so, however, power politics and trust manipulation have the perverse effect of turning
some stratified equilibria into a fighting equilibrium. Moreover, the effectiveness of both policy
tools is context-specific.
3.5 Ranking policies
Section 3.4 provided some insights on how the equilibrium outcomes are affected by UN
intervention. Here, we have a closer look at the relative effectiveness and straightfor-
wardness of the intervention tools under consideration in the general case.
Potential to induce the cooperative equilibrium
We now discuss whether UN action, with strictly positive private costs of conflict (c/Y ≥
0), but irrespective of other parameter values, can guarantee existence of a (C,C) equi-
librium. To allow for a (C,C) equilibrium, we need that δ1 ≤ δ1,K. Since we focus on
the case where α ≤ 12 , this condition is necessary and sufficient. Explicitly, we get the
following condition to establish a cooperative equilibrium:
δ1 ≤ α
[
1+
c
Y
]
.
Clearly, since only δ1 enters this inequality, only manipulation of δ1 can (always) guar-
antee that it holds true. Furthermore, the right-hand side of the inequality is strictly
positive; a severe strong boycott can, therefore, always ensure that the inequality holds
true. This result can easily be inferred from the pay-off matrix in Section 3.2. For δ1
going to zero, the (C,C) equilibrium becomes a dominant strategy equilibrium. Unique-
ness follows from the fact that with δ1 becoming very small, δ2K and δ2L become larger
than 1, such that δ2 ≤ δ2K and δ2 ≤ δ2L.
Policy Implication 4. Potential to enforce mutual cooperation when both players are oppor-
tunistic:
(a) The strong boycott can always guarantee that the cooperative equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium of the game.
(b) Neither a weak boycott, power politics nor trust building have the potential to guarantee
that the cooperative equilibrium is always an equilibrium of the game.
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Potential to preclude the fighting equilibrium
From an international policy point of view, it is not only interesting to know when a
particular policy tool will manage to make cooperation an equilibrium strategy, it is also
important to know whether this tool will manage to exclude the conflict equilibrium.
Corollary 7 states conditions on the parameter values for which each policy tool, pushed
to (one of its) extremes, can preclude the fighting equilibrium.
Corollary 7. Potential to preclude the fighting equilibrium when both players are opportunistic:
(a) A strong boycott can always preclude the fighting equilibrium.
(b) A weak boycott and power politics can preclude the fighting equilibrium if and only if:
c
Y
≥ min
{
δ1 − α
α
piLg ,
δ1 − (1− α)
1− α pi
K
g
}
.
(c) Manipulation of trust can preclude the fighting equilibrium if and only if:
c
Y
≥ min
{
δ1 − α
α
,
ρδ1δ1
α
,
δ1 − (1− α)
1− α ,
(1− ρ)δ1δ1
1− α
}
.
From Corollary 7 it is clear that strong a boycott is the only instrument that, for all
parameter configurations, can preclude the fighting equilibrium. Weak boycotts and
power politics face the same restricting condition on the private cost of fighting. Yet,
there is an important difference in how they ought to be implemented. Weak boycotts
have to be strong enough: δ2 must be small enough. Power politics must either make ρ
small enough, or high enough:
· if δ−(1−α)1−α piKg > cY > δ−αα piLg , ρ must be close enough to 0, while
· if δ−α1−αpiLg > cY > δ−(1−α)1−α piKg , ρ must be close enough to 1.
Moreover, if c/Y is larger than both elements of the set behind the min operator, both a
value of ρ close to 0 and close to 1 will eliminate the fighting equilibrium. In such a case,
the UN, when using power politics to eliminate a fighting equilibrium, has to decide
which group to grant, and which group to deprive of, power.
A similar issue occurs for the conditions under which trust manipulating can pre-
clude the fighting equilibrium. Depending on the value of c/Y, this can occur through
making piLg low or high enough or through making piKg low or high enough. If c/Y is
larger than all four conditions, each of these possible policies of trust manipulation can
preclude the fighting equilibrium. Again, it is not clear on which grounds such a decision
can be made.
The conditions in Corollary 7 for the UN to be able to preclude the fighting equilib-
rium depend on parameter values of the economy which might be difficult to observe.
Corollary 8 reformulates these conditions, assuming that the UN are unable to observe
δ1, δ2, ρ,piLg and piKg . Only α and c/Y can be observed.
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Corollary 8. Potential to preclude the fighting equilibrium for an uninformed UN when both
players are opportunistic:
(a) A strong boycott can always preclude the fighting equilibrium.
(b) A weak boycott, power politics and trust manipulation can preclude the fighting equilibrium
if and only if:
c
Y
≥ min
{
1− α
α
,
α
1− α
}
.
For an uninformed UN the condition on the private costs of fighting for trust manip-
ulation has become the same as for weak boycotts and power politics. With α ≤ 1/2,
the condition reduces to cY ≥ α1−α . If this condition holds, a severe enough weak boycott,
bringing ρ close enough to 1 and making piKg close enough to 1, eliminates the fighting
equilibrium. However, bringing ρ close enough to 0 and piLg close enough to 1 also elimi-
nates the fighting equilibrium. It is unclear how the UN could choose either policy over
the other. A final policy implication summarises the preceding discussion.
Policy Implication 5. Potential to preclude the fighting equilibrium when both players are
opportunistic.
(a) A severe enough strong boycott can always preclude the fighting equilibrium.
(b) A severe enough weak boycott and power politics can preclude the fighting equilibrium if the
private costs of conflict are above some threshold. This threshold can be lower or higher than
the threshold above which trust manipulation becomes effective. If the UN are uninformed,
these thresholds are the same for the three policy tools.
(c) To preclude the fighting equilibrium through power politics and trust manipulation, the
UN might face a delicate choice of which group to favour at the expense of the other group.
Policy recommendation
Policy Implications 2, 4 and 5 confirm the unconditional effectiveness of the strong boy-
cott: it can make mutual cooperation the unique equilibrium and, therefore, prevent the
conflictual society to be one, irrespective of the private costs of fighting. In contrast,
neither of the other intervention tools can make the cooperative equilibrium a possible
equilibrium when it wouldn’t be one without intervention. For some economies, how-
ever, weak boycotts, power politics and trust manipulation can reduce the number of
BN equilibria such that only the cooperative equilibrium remains. Finally, provided that
the cost of fighting exceeds a certain threshold, the latter three policy tools can allow an
uninformed UN to exclude the fighting equilibrium. An informed UN can achieve this
for a lower threshold.
Note, furthermore, from Policy Implication 3, that except for boycotts, the direction
of the necessary intervention is highly context-specific: it depends on the precise val-
ues of the parameters of the economy. Trust manipulation is very delicate: while it is
commonplace to assume that positive beliefs foster cooperation and negative beliefs may
lead to conflict, we find that the support for this statement is limited in our model. First,
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increasing trust has no effect on the size of the (C,C)–equilibrium: there is no impact of
beliefs on the occurrence of a fully integrated society. Second, the impact of beliefs on
the other equilibrium areas is tricky to predict: small differences in parameter values in
the neighbourhood of δ∗H can completely alter the consequences of trust building in an
economy. Finally, we know from Policy Implication 1 that, in mixed strategy equilibria,
increased trust always decreases the probability that a player chooses to cooperate. These
results, we believe, cast serious doubts on the attractiveness of trust manipulation as an
intervention tool for the UN in conflict prevention.
In sum, policy implications 1–5 allow us to postulate an effectiveness-ranking in the
four intervention types we have considered.
Corollary 9. Ranking of the intervention tools.
The strong boycott – which punishes all non-cooperative behaviour – constitutes an effective
and easy intervention tool, no matter what the costs of fighting are. The weak boycott and the
manipulation of relative power are effective under the same restriction on the private costs of
fighting. The weak boycott is far more straightforward than power politics. The manipulation
of trust, finally, is less effective than the strong boycott. Moreover, power politics and trust
manipulation require very specific knowledge of the values of the parameters of the economy in
order to be used successfully.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we use a simple game theoretic model to analyse what outside parties such
as the United Nations can do to prevent a civil conflict within a country. We focused
on the effects of boycotts, power politics and trust building and ignored problems of
implementation of these interventions. Admittedly, implementation problems can be
huge, but we argue that if in the absence of such problems an intervention lacks potential,
we probably should not even consider its implementation anyway.
Boycotts can be of two types: strong boycotts sanction any non-cooperative behaviour
while weak boycotts only sanction joint non-cooperative behaviour. Only the former type
of boycott can, irrespective of the private costs of conflict, always ensure that cooperation
is an equilibrium strategy for both parties. The reason is obvious: with societal costs of
non-cooperation rising above a certain level, mutual cooperation is always an equilibrium
strategy. By contrast, our model shows that neither weak boycotts nor power politics and
trust building have the potential to ensure that both players cooperate.
All four policy measures do, however, have the potential to prevent the society from
becoming conflictual. Again, the strong boycott has that potential irrespective of the
level of the private costs of conflict. For the weak boycott, power politics, and trust
manipulation to have that potential, private costs of conflict need to be above a certain
threshold. For an uninformed UN the threshold is the same for these three instruments.
If the UN is informed about the relevant parameter values, the threshold level is lower
than if it were uninformed, and the same for a weak boycott and power politics. The
threshold for trust manipulation can be lower or higher than for the latter two policy
tools.
Maybe even more importantly, we show that successfully using power politics and
trust manipulation requires much more information on the economic parameters than
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using boycotts: small mistakes in assessing the economic context can induce good pol-
icy intentions to generate horrific outcomes. Increasing one group’s relative power may
have desirable results in a certain context, but highly undesirable ones in another. Sim-
ilarly, the effects of a particular change in trust are very context-specific and sometimes
counterintuitive. We show, for example, that in order to prevent groups from fighting,
sometimes a decrease in trust is required: if a group believes that it is very likely that the
other group will cooperate, then that group can be induced to fight to reap the rewards of
becoming the dominant group in society. Under such circumstances, a decreased trust in
the cooperative nature of the other group can establish cooperative behaviour. Finally, by
hitting groups asymmetrically, power politics and, to a certain extent, trust manipulation
may well raise moral issues. Why should the UN favour one group over another?
Based on these results, a clear hierarchy of the intervention measures appears: strong
boycotts first, then weak boycotts, power politics, and, finally, trust building. Strangely
enough, though, in contemporary international politics, boycotts seem to be the least
popular intervention tools. This might, of course, have something to do with the dif-
ficulty of enforcing a boycott by all trading partners, due to the individual gains each
partner can obtain by shirking. The other intervention policies are clearly less prone to
this type of free-riding behaviour. However, by showing that (especially) a strong boycott
is the most predictable and most effective policy measure to prevent conflict and non-
cooperative behaviour of opposing groups, this paper clearly pleads for a reappraisal
of boycotts in conflict prevention and urges both researchers and the UN to develop
mechanisms to overcome free-riding problems associated with boycotts.

4INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PR ICES
With Thomas Demuynck
4.1 Introduction
The resurgence of civil conflicts after the Cold War has spurred a plethora of scientific
and policy inspired literature (Collier et al. [2003]). In an attempt to organise and guide
the vast literature, Sambanis [2002] provides a fundamental and exhaustive review of the
major theoretical and empirical contributions in the field so far. If one thing, his review
article clearly shows that more research on the causes of civil war is absolutely necessary.
Among the many and diverse analyses of the potential risk factors for civil war out-
break, there appears to be some (theoretical) agreement on the importance of economic
development and state strength (Sambanis [2002]; Lacina [2004]). One of the often cited
factors that relates to both underdevelopment and weak states is the dependence on
(certain) natural resources. It is, indeed, hard to disregard that a considerable share of
today’s conflicts occurs in areas where highly valuable and easily appropriable natural
resources account for a considerable share of generated income.
The two predominant academic views that link natural resources to civil war tend
to disagree on the linking mechanism. Among others, Fearon [2005] stresses the role of
grievances: ethnic, religious or political groups rebel against, for example, oppression
or inequality and find in natural resources the means to finance rebellion. Collier and
Hoeffler [2004] and the likes, on the other hand, attribute a greater role to greed, the
struggle for scarce resources. However relevant the true nature of the linking mechanism
may be, the fact remains that rebel groups need resources to be viable: waging war
requires armed forces and weaponry. Moreover, since warfare in itself does not create
economic surplus (at best, whatever one group gains, the other loses) it must extract
resources from other sectors in the economy. Obviously, sectors with excess profits, such
as non-contestable markets (e.g. oil or kimberlite diamond-mining), especially where
property rights are ill-defined, or illegal markets (e.g. drugs production or looting), are
natural candidates for such extraction.
Mineral resources, however, have played a very different role in different areas of the
world (Mehlum et al. [2006]): the discovery of valuable resources in the north-eastern
provinces of the DR Congo had a dramatically different effect on the country’s devel-
opment than a similar discovery had in Australia or Canada. They can, therefore, not
account for the full story. Another feature that many contemporaneous conflicts share,
is that they are predominantly fought in sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI [1998, 1999]), and
more specifically in underdeveloped rural areas with very few economic alternatives
to cultivating so-called ‘tropical agricultural commodities’: internationally traded (and
consumed) agricultural commodities (e.g. coffee or cocoa) which are predominantly pro-
duced by a large number of small farmers in rural areas, almost exclusively in developing
countries.
This unenviable, but distinct, position of sub-Saharan Africa surely justifies a context
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specific theoretical analysis. Therefore, like e.g. Azam [2002] and Miguel et al. [2004], we
present a local analysis and focus on those parameters that in our opinion characterise
a considerable share of today’s war-torn sub-Saharan African areas. On the one hand,
the model incorporates coercive oligopolies, a mining sector with imperfectly defined
property rights. We develop a general equilibrium model where – as in Collier [2000]
– we model rebel-groups as enterprises that compete for the mineral resource abundant
areas. The profits that accrue to those who control the resource abundant territories
allure other potential ‘firms.’ This entrance will last as long as the profits from operating
the mines in the conquered areas exceed the costs of running a rebel organisation. In this
sense, we endogenise the number of warring groups: the viable number of rebel groups
follows from the equilibrium zero profit condition. Moreover, competition between the
competing firms is not settled by the market (prices) for mineral rich areas but by the
relative investments in arms and armed forces.
Like in the seminal paper by Grossman [1991], we stress the arbitrage between the
returns from fighting and the returns from conventional economic activity: besides the
mineral sector we incorporate an agrarian sector that produces tropical agricultural com-
modities. The context we consider, therefore, is very specific: a poorly diversified econ-
omy where mining is the only conventional employment alternative to producing a tropi-
cal agricultural commodity,1 and where besides mining or farming, labourers can choose
to join a rebel group. The relative attractiveness of one sector to another then depends on
the world market prices: be it in New York or in London,2 the price setting is exogenous
to the local market but determines the profits and, hence, the attractiveness of the differ-
ent sectors. We study how changes in the world market prices of mineral resources and
tropical agricultural commodities have an impact on the investment in armed forces and
weapons and on the viable number of rebel groups in a certain area. Thus, by exploring
the causal link between adverse external price shocks and civil war, we attempt to fill
one of the gaps in the current literature (Sambanis [2002, p. 230]).
Before discussing our main findings, it is worthwhile to briefly elaborate on a paper
by Azam [2002] that is closely related to ours in spirit. Although the paper has a different
focus than ours – it looks at the determinants of the levels of fighting and looting – Azam
too starts from a sub-Saharan African context. He considers two ethnoregional groups
that optimise their respective allocation of labour over production (farming), fighting
and looting and each warlord or group’s leader optimises his own group’s utility. The
three major aspects in which our analysis differs from his allow us to pinpoint the core
specifications of our model. First, in order to allow for mineral resources to play a role,
we add a productive (mining) rather than a predatory (looting) sector to the economy.
Second, contrary to Azam (and the majority of contributions to this literature), we en-
dogenise the potential number of warring groups. In our model, conflict between two
1Our focus on such a ‘restricted’ labour market is inspired by the fact that many of the least developed
countries (most often war-torn too) rely heavily, that is for more than half their total export earnings, on
three or fewer (in most cases just one) of such (a) tropical agricultural commodities (FAO [2004]). Our
analyses is, therefore, complementary to Addison [2005], who looks at the importance of agriculture for
development in more general terms, i.e., he also takes those agricultural commodities for which developing
countries have to compete with developed countries (like cotton, sugar, corn, etc.) into account.
2The New York Board of Trade provides the most important futures and options markets for several
internationally traded agricultural commodities: cocoa, coffee, cotton, orange juice and sugar. The London
Metal Exchange is the most important non-ferrous metals futures and options market.
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groups is not predetermined by the core assumptions: whether conflict erupts and how
many groups participate in it depends on the equilibrium conditions of the model. Fi-
nally, by incorporating their entire ethnoregional group’s utility, in Azam [2002] warlords
are viewed as agents that advance an entire ethnoregional group’s interests, by which
his model inherently carries the ‘grievance factor’ within it. In contrast, we allow for
a ‘greedy’ rebel leader: although rebel groups may (or may not) evolve around ethnic
lines, the rebel leader only optimises (and possibly appropriates) the rebel group’s profit.
The paper has two major contributions, from which several policy recommendations
derive. First, we show that international commodity prices matter for Third World civil
conflict. On the one hand, the accelerated world economic development, which mainly
occurred in the western world, intensified the search for natural resources. The fact
that those resources happen to be abundant especially in certain underdeveloped areas
in Africa implies that the costs and benefits from this modernisation3 process accrue
to different parts of the world: while the western world enjoys (strong) economic de-
velopment, southern countries bear the costs of the struggle for the required mineral
resources. We show that the sustained economic development in First World coun-
tries may well have increased political tension in underdeveloped and mineral-rich Third
World countries: the increasing demand for primary commodities makes resource-rich
but poor countries very vulnerable to the struggle for those resources. In other words,
sub-Saharan Africa may suffer (part of) the cost of the sustained economic advancement
of the high income countries. On the other hand, we show that tropical agricultural
commodity prices matter just as much: a drop in those prices increases the attractive-
ness of other economic assets such as minerals. High relative prices of coffee, cocoa or
palm oil would, therefore, offer sub-Saharan African labourers a valuable alternative to
mining and, more importantly, to the struggle for its spoils. We thus provide a theoreti-
cal mechanism through which exogenous variables such as weather shocks and climatic
hazards, but also international price shocks,4 can have an impact on civil conflict. We
show that both rising mineral prices and falling tropical agricultural commodity prices
may be important determinants of rebellion and that, essentially, it is their relation that
matters.
Second, we show that the occurrence of civil war may carry within itself a non-
reversible component. If an increase of mineral prices or a decrease of tropical agri-
cultural commodity prices (or a combination of the two) triggers civil conflict, a mere
return of the prices to their pre-conflict level may not be sufficient to end the conflict.
The mechanism behind this result is that a civil conflict, due to its destructive nature,
lowers agricultural productivity and reduces wages in agriculture. The resulting lower
equilibrium market wage increases the mining profits and, thus, lowers the threshold
3By looking at the effect of external price shocks on the sub-Saharan labour market, our model contains
an element of modernisation theory (Newman [1991]).
4By using variation in rainfall as an instrumental variable for income growth, Miguel et al. [2004, p. 727]
find that “GDP growth is significantly negatively related to the incidence of civil conflict in sub-Saharan
Africa” and that this relationship is “very strong.” In an extensive empirical study of politically-motivated
violence in Colombia between 1988 and 2004, Dube and Vargas [2007, p. 31] show that a “higher value of
[coffee] in international markets eases social unrest, while a lower value exacerbates politically-motivated
violence.” Furthermore, it is probably not a mere coincidence that the civil war in Coˆte d’Ivoire (Woods
[2003]) and the genocide in Rwanda (Kamola [2007]) erupted shortly after a sharp decline in the world
prices of, respectively, cocoa and coffee.
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mineral price below which, or increases the tropical agricultural commodity price above
which, only a single rebel group is viable.
The following policy recommendations derive from these results. First, since relative
international commodity prices matter for conflict, taxing mineral resources and support-
ing the prices of tropical agricultural commodities may be effective instruments to end
or prevent civil conflict. Moreover, our results may explain the failure of certain peace
agreements (Regan [2002]; Fearon [2004]): irrespective of what policy makers or warlords
agree, as long as the economic trade-off for labourers is in favour of mining or joining
rebel organisations, there will always be an incentive for some new warlord or shrewd
rebel commander to exploit this labour supply. Therefore, it may not always be sensible
to broker a peace agreement. Furthermore, it is shown that weapon embargoes may
backfire: although they can reduce the duration of an ongoing war, pre-emptive weapon
embargoes may actually trigger civil conflict. Finally, and maybe most importantly, by
sustaining economic diversification, local authorities and the international community
can reduce Third World countries’ vulnerability to fluctuating world market prices for
tropical agricultural commodities and, thus, their proneness to civil conflict.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the assumptions and develops
the model. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 elaborate on the impact of the international prices of min-
eral resources and tropical agricultural commodities on, respectively, the onset and the
persistence of civil conflicts. Section 4.5 analyses the effectiveness of weapon embargoes
to prevent or end civil conflict, Section 4.6 extends the model to include other sectors
and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 A benchmark model
We consider a predominantly rural area with a lack of, or ill-defined, political and prop-
erty rights. We analyse the specific context where economic activity and the correspond-
ing value added are concentrated in two sectors: small scale agriculture of an internation-
ally traded commodity (e.g. coffee or cocoa) and artisanal mining (e.g. alluvial diamonds
or coltan).
We consider an economy with N agents, where each agent supplies one unit of labour
inelastically and extracts utility from his wage, w. In order to preclude corner solutions,
we assume that labour supply is large enough to secure production in both the mining
sector and the agricultural sector.
The agricultural sector
We assume an agricultural sector with Ma units of agricultural land. Each agricultural
firm has a constant returns to scale production function fa(la, La) = lαa L1−αa with α ∈]0, 1[,
where la is the amount of labour input and La the amount of agricultural land a firm
uses. The price for agricultural output, pa, is exogenously determined on international
markets. If w is the wage per unit of labour and sa the price per unit of agricultural land,
then we can write the profit for an agricultural firm as:
pia = pa f (la, La)− wla − saLa
= La (pa f (la/La, 1)− wla/La − sa) , (4.1)
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where equation (4.1) follows from the constant returns to scale production function.
Each agricultural firm will optimise its profit per unit of land. The first order condition
of equation (4.1) with respect to la/La determines the optimal amount of labour per unit
of land, (la/La)∗ as a function of w and pa:5
pa
∂ f (la/La)
∂(la/La)
= w↔
(
la
La
)∗
=
( pmα
w
) 1
1−α
. (4.2)
Define pi∗a as the corresponding optimal profit in the agricultural sector:
pi∗a = La
[
pa f
((
la
La
)∗
, 1
)
− w
(
la
La
)∗
− sa
]
. (4.3)
Assuming perfect competition in the agricultural sector and, therefore, zero profits in
equilibrium, equation (4.3) allows us to derive the optimal price of land, s∗a , as a function
of w and pa:
s∗a = f
((
la
La
)∗
, 1
)
− w
(
la
La
)∗
. (4.4)
With a fixed endowment of agricultural land, Ma, the total amount of labour employed
in the agricultural sector will be equal to Ma(la/La)∗.
The mining and rebel sector
We focus on geographically concentrated mineral resources and we assume that there
are Mm units of mineral abundant land to extract, say, Mm is the amount of mining
sites. Mining firms are assumed to be controlled by rebel organisations who skim off the
excess profits in this sector. Somewhat jumping ahead, we assume that each mining firm
is owned by a single rebel group and we model the ‘contest’ for the exploitation rights
of a mine as ‘civil war’ between n rebel groups (n is endogenously determined and will
be modelled in Section 4.2). It is helpful to think of this competition as an alternative
economic activity besides mining and farming: the rebel sector.
Output of a mining firm, i, is given by the constant returns to scale production func-
tion fm(li, ti) = l
β
i (Miti)
1−β with β ∈]0, 1[, where li is the amount of labour and ti the
fraction of the resource abundant land that is owned by rebel group i. The output price
of mineral resources, pm, is determined on the international market and, therefore, ex-
ogenous.
Output of the rebel sector is the fraction of mineral resource rich land, ti, that a rebel
group i controls and exploits. Input for the rebellion sector consists of an army, ai, and
weaponry, gi. We assume that the price of weapons, pg, is determined on the interna-
tional market while rebel wages are determined on the labour market. We assume that
rebel groups recruit solely on the local labour market.6 Thus, individuals can choose
5Note that variables with an asterisk represent optimal values.
6If a rebel group hires mercenaries, we assume that these soldiers have to be paid in advance and that
we can, therefore, incorporate their wages in the costs of weaponry.
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between mining, farming or enrolling in a rebel army. Equilibrium on the labour mar-
ket requires that individuals are indifferent to working in either sector. In equilibrium,
therefore, wages are the same across all sectors: w.
A rebel group ‘produces’ war power. Let h(ai, gi) = a
γ
i g
δ
i be a rebel group’s pro-
duction function, where γ, δ > 0. The fraction of mining land that is controlled by rebel
group i, ti, is determined by its relative ‘competitiveness,’ its war power relative to the
competing rebel groups, which we represent by the following competitiveness function:
ti({aj, gj}j≤n) = h(ai, gi)∑nj=1 h(aj, gj)
. (4.5)
Equation (4.5) is similar to Hirshleifer’s [1995] Contest Success Function. The parameters
γ and δ are the elasticities of the function h with respect to ai and gi. The sum of γ
and δ represents what Hirshleifer [1995] calls the ‘decisiveness parameter’: the degree to
which increased investments in soldiers and weapons are translated in a higher victory
probability. In Section 4.2, we will further elaborate on the meaning and impact of these
elasticities.
Then, assuming that there is a fixed cost F of operating and controlling a mine (shov-
els, sieves, small pumps, etc. on the one hand, and, for instance, recruitment costs on the
other), the profits for rebel group i are given by:
pii = pm fm(li,Mmti)− wli − wai − pggi − F.
To maximise their profits, rebel groups take potential other groups’ actions as given,
which generates the following first order conditions with respect to li, ai and gi:
w = pm
∂ fm(li,Mmti)
∂li
, (4.6)
w = pm
∂ fm(li,Mmti)
∂ti
∂ti
∂ai
, (4.7)
pg = pm
∂ fm(li,Mmti)
∂ti
∂ti
∂gi
. (4.8)
Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) allow us to derive the three (implicit) equations which
determine the optimal quantities: l∗i , a
∗
i and g
∗
i (and t
∗
i ) as functions of the endogenous
variables w, lj, aj, gj for j 6= i and the exogenous variables Mm, pm and pg:7
l∗i =
[
pmβ
w
] 1
1−β
Mmt∗i , (4.9)
a∗i =
pm
w
(1− β) fm(l∗i ,Mmt∗i )(1− t∗i )γ, (4.10)
g∗i =
pm
pg
(1− β) fm(l∗i ,Mmt∗i )(1− t∗i )δ. (4.11)
We consider the symmetric case where each rebel group has the same objective func-
tion and the same optimal values of l∗i , a
∗
i and g
∗
i . In that case, t
∗
i =
1
n , and for each rebel
7It can be shown that the second order conditions for a maximum are also satisfied.
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group i and j, it holds that l∗j = l
∗
i , a
∗
j = a
∗
i and g
∗
j = g
∗
i . The equilibrium profit for a
rebel group – given the total number of competing rebel groups – can then be written as:
pi∗i = pm fm
(
l∗i ,Mm
1
n
)
− wl∗i − wa∗i − pgg∗i . (4.12)
By substituting conditions (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) into equation (4.12), this yields:
pi∗i = Mm
1
n
p
1
1−β
m
[
β
w
] β
1−β
(1− β)
[
1− (γ+ δ)
(
1− 1
n
)]
− F. (4.13)
Note that pi∗i depends on w, n, pm and Mm, but not directly on pg.
Clearing the labour market
To pinpoint the equilibrium values of l∗a , l∗i , a
∗
i and g
∗
i , we still need to determine the
equilibriumwage w∗. Equilibrium on the labour market imposes the following condition:
N = Ma
(
la
La
)∗
+ n (a∗i + l
∗
i ) . (4.14)
The value of w for which equation (4.14) holds, determines the equilibrium wage w∗
as a function of n and the exogenous variables pa, pm, Ma, Mm, N and pg. If we substitute
equation (4.2), (4.9) and (4.10) in condition (4.14), we obtain:
N = Ma
[ paα
w∗
] 1
1−α + Mm
[
pmβ
w∗
] 1
1−β [
1+
1− β
β
γ
(
1− 1
n
)]
. (4.15)
First, note that equation (4.15) does not depend directly on pg. Furthermore, it is
readily seen that in order to preserve the equilibrium on the labour market, an increase
in Ma, pa, Mm or pm will require an increase in w∗. An increase in N, on the other hand,
will require a decrease of the equilibrium wage, w∗. Finally, and maybe most importantly
in the context of this paper, note that if the amount of mineral resource rich land (Mm)
is very small compared to the amount of agricultural land (Ma), the equilibrium market
wage is mainly determined by pa. Hence, while a change in pa will require a large
adjustment of the equilibrium wage, a change in pm, Ma or Mm will only require minor
adjustments in order to preserve the equilibrium on the labour market.
Equilibrium number of rebel groups
Substituting the equilibrium wage into equation (4.13), we can derive a rebel group’s
equilibrium profit as a function of n, and the exogenous variables pm, Mm, pa, Ma and
N:
pi∗i = Mm
1
n
p
1
1−β
m
[
β
w∗
] β
1−β
(1− β)
[
1− (γ+ δ)
(
1− 1
n
)]
− F. (4.16)
Equation (4.16) is strictly decreasing in n (see also Appendix B.1) for n ∈ [1,∞[). Then,
if we assume that positive profits for rebel organisations will attract other potential rebel
groups, i.e. that n will increase as long as:
pi∗i (n) ≥ 0, (4.17)
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it follows that the equilibrium/viable number of rebel groups, n∗, can be determined as
the greatest integer n that still satisfies equation (4.17), and that this value is unique.8
Note that the equilibrium number of rebel groups, n∗, is an integer. It is, therefore,
likely that rebel organisations make strictly positive profits. We assume that these excess
profits accrue to the rebel leader, who is taken to be a member of the rebel army: the rebel
leader receives a wage w, increased with these excess profits. Since consumption prices
are exogenously determined in our model, the (potentially) resulting excess consumption
of this rebel leader will not have equilibrium consequences.
The outbreak of civil war
Straightforward comparative static analysis can now reveal the potential impact of price
fluctuations on the respective international markets within poor but resource-rich rural
sub-Saharan African areas.
Formally, civil war requires that condition (4.17) is satisfied for some n ≥ 2. Since, as
shown in Section 4.2, profits pi∗i are decreasing in n, there will be civil war if and only if
pi∗i ≥ 0 for n = 2. Civil war, therefore, requires that:
pi∗i (2) =
Mm
2
[
pmββ
(w∗)β
] 1
1−β
(1− β)− F︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
− Mm
2
[
pmββ
(w∗)β
] 1
1−β (1− β)(γ+ δ)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
I I
≥ 0, (4.18)
where w∗ is determined by:
N = Ma
[ paα
w∗
] 1
1−α + Mm
[
pmβ
w∗
] 1
1−β [
1+
1− β
β
γ
1
2
]
. (4.19)
We split equation (4.18), and call Part I a rebel group’s (hypothetical) operational revenue,
i.e. profits a rebel group obtains without incorporating the costs of fighting:
Mm
2
[
pmββ
(w∗)β
] 1
1−β
(1− β)− F = Mmpm fm(l∗i , 1/2)− w∗l∗i − F, (4.20)
and Part II its (hypothetical) operational cost:
Mm
2
[
pmββ
(w∗)β
] 1
1−β (1− β)(γ+ δ)
2
= w∗a∗i + pgg
∗
i . (4.21)
Observe that when γ+ δ ≥ 2, pi∗i (2) is always negative and the equilibrium number of
rebel organisations will always be less than 2. Therefore, we will focus on the more inter-
esting case where γ+ δ < 2, where conflict is not excluded by technological constraints.
Assumption 1. Conflict is not excluded by war power-producing technologies: γ+ δ < 2.
The subsequent sections elaborate on how some pertinent exogenous variables may
influence condition (4.18) and, therefore, the potential onset/offset of civil conflict.
8We assume that if pi∗i (1) < 0, then n
∗ = 0.
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4.3 International commodity prices
We first analyse the potential impact of fluctuations in the international prices of mineral
resources and tropical agricultural commodities on civil conflict.
Mineral resources
An increase in the international prices of mineral resources (pm) will increase pi∗i (2)
(cf. Appendix B.2) and may, therefore, trigger a civil war.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. An increase in pm increases both
the operational costs of running a rebel organisation (equation (4.21)) and – by directly
increasing the operational revenue of mining – a rebel organisation’s potential income
(equation (4.20)). However, by Assumption 1, we know that the first effect is smaller than
the second.
Policy Implication 6. Taxing mineral resources may be an effective tool to prevent or end civil
conflict in poor but resource-rich countries.
Low mineral resource prices reduce the risk of a civil war in rural areas with few
economic alternatives. Since prices are set on international markets, the international
community may agree to impose a tax on the sales of mineral resources from that coun-
try to reduce the relative attractiveness of its mining industry. It should, however, be
acknowledged that, especially with easily accessible and lootable resources, tax evasion
is undoubtedly a legitimate concern.
Tropical agricultural commodities
From equation (4.15) we know that a decrease in the tropical agricultural commodity
prices pa decreases the equilibrium wage w∗ which, in turn, increases the potential profits
for the rebel organisation, pi∗i (2) (cf. Appendix B.3). A decrease in pa increases the
operational revenue of mining and the operational cost of a rebel organisation. However,
due to Assumption 1 we know that the total increase in potential income is higher than
the total increase in potential costs.
Policy Implication 7. High(er) prices for tropical agricultural commodities can be an effective
tool to prevent or end conflict in poor but resource-rich countries.
In order to reduce its proneness to conflict, a country would favour low profits in
the mining sector. It should be of interest for international policy makers that, as the
current model shows, the prices for tropical agricultural commodities can serve the same
goal. If, for example, the prices of mineral resources increase due to the increased de-
mand, the price of tropical agricultural commodities remains a valuable tool to prevent
the outbreak of civil conflicts. Which tool serves best will depend on the various pro-
duction technologies in the economy and, probably even more so, on the implementing
institution. In any case, we hope to show that, as an instrument to reduce a rural area’s
proneness to conflict, measures to support international prices for tropical agricultural
commodities provide an alternative to taxing mineral resources.
Policy Implication 8. Favourable international commodity prices are conducive to peace.
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4.4 The persistence of civil war
So far, the analysis was static. A civil war, however, has a devastating impact on the
stocks of physical and human capital in the economy. Capital flight, the destruction
of infrastructure and casualties of war, especially in the economically productive age
range, reduce the economic potential of war-torn areas dramatically (Imai and Weinstein
[2000]).
In order to incorporate this negative impact of civil war into our model, we allow for
shifting productivity in the agricultural sector9 (Fulginiti et al. [2004]). During civil war
we assume less capital intensive agricultural commodity production in less accessible ar-
eas (because of, e.g., hazardous transportation) with less productive labourers (children,
elderly).
Assume that at time instance v ∈ [0,∞[, civil war destroys a fraction 1 − σ(v) of
the agricultural production, with σ(.) : [0,∞[→ [0, 1]. The function σ(.) represents the
fraction of an economy’s potential agricultural production that is actually produced. A
rise in σ has similar implications as an increase of the agricultural price pa. Therefore,
by equation (4.15), an increase in σ induces an increase in the equilibrium wage w∗. Let
σ˙(v) = limh→0
h>0
σ(v+h)−σ(v)
h and assume that there exists a ‘lower bound’ σl ∈]0, 1[ such
that:
σ˙(v) > 0 if and only if n∗ ≤ 1 and σ(v) < 1,
σ˙(v) < 0 if and only if n∗ > 1 and σ(v) > σl ,
σ˙(v) = 0 if and only if n∗ ≤ 1 and σ(v) = 1 or n∗ > 1 and σ(v) = σl .
(4.22)
This means that σ(v) decreases over time as long as there is a civil war (until the lower
bound is reached) and increases during periods of peace. Therefore, the longer the civil
war lasts, the smaller the fraction of potential output that is actually realised becomes.
The dynamics of these productivity shifts are illustrated in Figure 4.1, which displays
the hypothetical profits of a rebel group when the number of rebel groups is equal to 2,
i.e. equation (4.18), as a function of the price of mineral resources (pm). pii(σl) and pii(1)
show the profits of mining for the border-levels of agricultural productivity, during war
and peace respectively.
Assume an increase in the price of mineral resources on the international market
from p0 to p1, a price which is higher than the threshold-price pr at which rebellion
shifts to be viable for more than one group. Assume, therefore, a peaceful economy
where mining generates insufficient added value to support two or more rebel groups
(pii,0 < 0) that, by the (mis?) fortunes of a price increase for mineral resources on the
international market, turns into a conflict economy where two or more groups would
find an interest in exploiting the mine (pii,1 ≥ 0). The higher mineral prices increase the
mining profits from pii,0 to pii,1 and lead to the entrance of a second rebel group. The
emerging conflict causes destruction of agricultural output: the profit function gradually
moves from pii(1) to pii(σl). The resulting lower mining wages then increase the profits
of mining from pii,1 to pi′i,1.
9Since we consider small scale/artisanal mining (cf. Section 4.2), productivity in the mining sector is
assumed not to suffer from civil war.
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Figure 4.1: The persistence of civil war
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It is readily seen from Figure 4.1 that reversing the process will require a much greater
decrease in mineral prices than a mere return to the pre-war level: a decrease in mineral
prices from p1 to p0 keeps the mining profits above the threshold (pi′i,0 ≥ 0) and therefore
does not initiate a return to the pre-war level of agricultural productivity. For peace to
return, prices of minerals would have to drop below pl , the price level at which mining
does not generate enough value added to entice more than one rebel group to exploit it.
These simple dynamics demonstrate how the outbreak of civil war may be subject to
‘stickiness’: a price increase that leads to an outbreak of civil war will not be recovered
by a mere reversing of the price increase. Moreover, the longer the war wages, the larger
the decrease in mineral prices or the increase in tropical agricultural commodity prices
will have to be in order to end the war.
Policy Implication 9. The longer a war wages, the less effective international commodity prices
become as an instrument to foster conditions favourable to peace.
4.5 A weapon embargo
A weapon embargo restricts the accessibility of weapons and is likely to alter the tech-
nology of conflict. It is, therefore, an obvious and popular (DellaVigna and La Ferrara
[2008]) policy instrument to deter conflict. We distinguish between an embargo’s direct
effect – on the rebel group’s investment decision – and its indirect effect – on the level
and size of destruction a war entails.
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A rebel group’s investment decision
Restricted access to weapons
In a strict sense, a watertight weapon embargo implies that rebel groups can not purchase
weapons anymore: each rebel group therefore takes the amount gi = g¯ ≤ g∗i as given
and optimises its expected profit with respect to li and ai. Condition (4.18) then changes
to:
pi∗i (2) = pa fm(l
∗
i , 1/2)(1− β− 1/2(1− β)γ)− pg g¯− F. (4.23)
Equation (4.23) will be larger than equation (4.18) if and only if pgg∗i ≥ pg g¯, which
we assume. Hence, maybe rather surprisingly, with constant scale-elasticity, instead of
preventing it, a watertight weapon embargo may well lead to civil conflict: by lowering
the operational costs without affecting the operational revenue, an effective embargo
increases the expected profits of rebellion. Without constant scale-elasticity, the effect is
undetermined.
Considering the history of weapon embargoes, however, watertightness may not be
the most realistic assumption (Tierney [2005]; DellaVigna and La Ferrara [2008]). Espe-
cially in poor third world countries, where wars are primarily fought with small arms,
the legal prohibition of the arms-trade is more likely to merely restrain the access to
weapons and, thereby, to increase their price pg. Surprisingly again, with constant scale-
elasticity, the price of weapons has no influence on the constraint that determines the
outbreak of civil war (see equation (4.18)).
Policy Implication 10. Restricting the access to weapons is ineffective to deter civil conflict.
Restricted war technology
A weapon embargo presumably also affects the technology of war and conflict (γ+ δ):
by restricting the access to certain types of weapons, an embargo may constrain rebel
groups to resort to different fighting technologies.
To see how changing war technologies may affect civil war, it is important to under-
stand the distinction between what Hirshleifer [1995] calls defensive and offensive tech-
nologies. With offensive technologies, γ+ δ is large, marginally more arms investments
are converted in considerable war power differences and, therefore, in a considerably
larger share of the mining sector. In contrast, with defensive technologies, γ+ δ is small,
differences in arms investments have a limited effect on relative war power. With the
latter, therefore, rebel groups have no incentive to be large and hypothetical operational
costs (w∗a∗i + pgg
∗
i ) will be low. This, in turn, increases the viable number of rebel groups:
with defensive technologies even low hypothetical operational profits can be sufficient
to trigger civil conflict. Therefore, since it is likely to impose lower – more defensive
– war technologies, a weapon embargo can be expected to trigger, rather than prevent,
civil conflict.
Policy Implication 11. A weapon embargo that leads to a more defensive war technology may
induce civil conflict.
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The level and size of destruction
It is highly probable that the level of σ and the size of σ˙ depend on the size of a∗i , g
∗
i
and on the fighting technology γ+ δ: when armies and weapon arsenals are large, and
if the technology is offensive (γ + δ is large), we may expect a more destructive and
devastating conflict and, thus, larger persistence effects of civil war.
Therefore, to the extent that a weapon embargo reduces the quantity of weapons
and lowers the war technology that is available to the warring groups, it may limit the
persistence of civil conflict.
Policy Implication 12. A weapon embargo that leads to a more defensive war technology may
mitigate the persistence of civil conflict.
The impact of a weapon embargo, therefore, crucially depends on its timing: a pre-
emptive embargo, by lowering the operational costs of rebellion, may actually trigger
a conflict, while a reactive embargo, by limiting the destruction caused by a conflict, is
likely to reduce its duration.10
4.6 Economic diversification
So far, we have considered two (productive) sectors, agriculture and mining, and have
shown that the equilibrium wage w∗ largely depends on the international price of the
agriculture commodity, pa. Here, we show how the model can easily be extended to
incorporate multiple sectors.
Consider a sector k, which we call the manufacturing sector. A manufacturing firm
uses an amount of labour, lk, and an amount of ‘manufacturing capital’11 equal to ck. We
assume that the total amount of manufacturing capital available in the economy, Mk, is
fixed, and that its price, sk, is determined endogenously. Manufacturing production is
determined by a constant returns to scale production function:
fk(lk, ck) = l
η
k c
1−η
k .
We assume that the price of a manufacturing good, pk, is determined on international
markets. Therefore, profits per firm are given by:
pik = pk fk(lk, ck)− wlk − skck = ck
[
fk
(
lk
ck
, 1
)
− w lk
ck
− sc
]
.
The first-order condition with respect to lk/ck determines the optimal amount of labour
per unit of manufacturing capital (lk/ck)∗ as a function of w and pk:(
lk
ck
)∗
=
( pkη
w
) 1
1−η
.
10The net effect will be determined by a trade-off between the increase in σ due to the embargo and the
upward shift in pi∗i (2) due to a more defensive technology.
11Think of manufacturing capital as the essential infrastructure, e.g. factory buildings, machinery etc.,
that is fixed in the short term.
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The zero profit condition determines the equilibrium price of capital s∗c . Total labour
demand by the manufacturing sector is Mk(lk/ck)∗ and the equilibrium wage, w∗, is
determined by the equilibrium condition on the labour market:
N = Ma(la/La)∗ + Mk(lk/ck)∗ + n∗ (a∗i + l
∗
i ) . (4.24)
It is easy to see that when pa decreases, the resulting decrease in w∗ – necessary to make
the equilibrium condition binding – will be less than in our basic model. Therefore,
introducing an extra sector lowers the equilibrium wage’s sensitivity to a change in agri-
cultural prices. Generalising equation (4.24), by including multiple sectors j = 1, . . . ,m:
N =
m
∑
j=1
Mj(lj/zj)∗ + n∗(a∗i + l
∗
i ),
where zj is an industry-specific production factor. We demonstrate that – in this specific
setting – more economic diversity lowers the equilibrium wage’s sensitivity to fluctua-
tions of a single price, pj.
Considering the high volatility of – especially tropical – agricultural commodity
prices and the much more stable prices for manufacturing goods, diversifying away from
tropical agricultural commodity prices and further industrialisation are likely to reduce
the conflict proneness of many, especially sub-Saharan African, rural areas.
4.7 Conclusion
We have used conventional economic analysis, a simple general equilibrium model, to
analyse the potential influence of the world market prices for mineral resources and
tropical agricultural commodities on civil conflict in poor sub-Saharan African countries.
This analysis allows us to draw some remarkable conclusions and formulate policy rec-
ommendations.
First, the well-documented link between mineral resources and civil conflict is cor-
roborated by our model: international market prices for mineral resources affect the
opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement and, therefore, the labour market choice
in many rural areas with limited alternatives on the labour market. Therefore, an in-
crease in the prices of mineral resources can trigger civil conflict. Moreover, we show
that the tropical agricultural commodity prices have an inverse, but analogous, impact
on civil conflict. High or increasing tropical agricultural commodity prices reduce the
attractiveness of economic activities such as, for instance, mining or rebellion: they turn
farming into a valuable labour alternative for rural labourers and, thus, reduce a coun-
try’s proneness to conflict. International commodity prices may, in other words, provide
the international community with an instrument to foster peace in the Third World.
Consequently, our model provides an explanation for the failure of peace agreements.
Unfavourable international commodity prices may make peace agreements unsustain-
able when the labour market alternatives are limited: when the prices of mineral re-
sources are relatively too high to make farming a valuable alternative to predation on
the mining sector, the labour market will provide new potential rebel leaders an incen-
tive to step in, or the old rebel leaders an incentive to breach the peace agreement they
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signed. Hence, for peace agreement negotiations to be worthwhile, the labour market
should provide potential rebels and looters with alternative economic activities.
Furthermore, we show that, through its destructive impact on agricultural productiv-
ity, civil war perpetuates itself. For instance, a decrease in the prices of tropical agricul-
tural commodities that triggers civil war, decreases agricultural productivity and, there-
fore, equilibrium market wages. These lower wages increase the profits of mining even
more and increase the attractiveness of contesting the right to exploit the mine. There-
fore, the necessary increase in tropical agricultural commodity prices will be larger than
the initial decrease in those prices that triggered the conflict.
Maybe rather surprisingly, then, it is shown that a pre-emptive weapon embargo
may actually trigger a conflict: by lowering the operational costs of rebellion, it increases
its potential profits. Since, on the other hand, a weapon embargo may also reduce the
duration of an ongoing conflict, the timing of its implementation is likely to affect the
effectiveness of a weapon embargo.
Finally, the model establishes diversification of the economic activity as a critical
instrument for deterring conflict: by reducing its dependence on (fluctuations of) the in-
ternational market, and by providing its labourers with productive economic alternatives
when small scale farming turns unprofitable, it reduces an area’s conflict proneness. It
should be clear, however, that the consequent recommendation carries beyond vulnera-
ble countries alone: the international community, too, can contribute to such diversifi-
cation. First, and probably most easily, international donor countries and agencies (the
aid side) can bolster production – both agricultural and industrial – for the local market
and should be wary of exacerbating Third World countries’ dependence on tropical agri-
cultural commodities. More fundamentally, however, First World agricultural policy (the
trade side) could be altered in favour of a less distorted world market. It is widely ac-
knowledged that First World export subsidies for non-tropical agricultural commodities
distort agriculture in tropical areas in favour of a limited number of tropical commodi-
ties, and that so-called ‘tariff escalation’ (higher import duties for processed products
than for raw commodities) inhibits the development of a processing sector. Therefore,
by potentially nurturing civil conflict, First World agricultural policy may well impose a
highly underestimated cost on resource-rich but tropical agricultural commodity depen-
dent countries.
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AAPPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let group H ∈ {K, L} play strategy X,Z ∈ {C, F}. Let uH(X,Z) be the average payoff of
a member of an opportunistic group H if group K plays strategy X and group L plays
strategy Z.
(a) First we consider equilibria in pure strategies. Player K will cooperate (fight) if and
only if the expected advantage of cooperating is larger (smaller) than the expected
advantage of fighting: K chooses C (F)⇔[
piLg + (1− piLg )piLc|o
]
uK (C,C) + (1− piLg )(1− piLc|o)uK (C, F)
≥ (<)
[
piLg + (1− piLg )piLc|o
]
uK (F,C) + (1− piLg )(1− piLc|o)uK (F, F)
⇔
[
piLg + (1− piLg )piLc|o
] [
Y− 1
α
δ1Y+ c
]
≥ (<) (1− piLg )(1− piLc|o)
[ρ
α
δ1δ2Y− c
]
. (A.1)
For player L we obtain a similar result: L chooses C (F)⇔[
piKg + (1− piKg )piKc|o
] [
Y− 1
1− αδ1Y+ c
]
≥ (<) (1− piKg )(1− piKc|o)
[
1− ρ
1− αδ1δ2Y− c
]
. (A.2)
A first equilibrium is the cooperative equilibrium: piLc|o = pi
K
c|o = 1. With K choosing
C and piLc|o = 1, (A.1) requires that:
Y− 1
α
δ1Y+ c ≥ 0 ⇔ δ1 ≤ δ1,K.
Similarly, with L choosing C and piKc|o = 1, (A.2) yields:
Y− 1
1− αδ1Y+ c ≥ 0 ⇔ δ1 ≤ δ1,L.
A second equilibrium is the fighting equilibrium: piLc|o = pi
K
c|o = 0. In this case
statements (A.1) and (A.2) show that the sign of the inequalities has to be reversed.
Reversed inequality (A.1) with piLc|o = 0 requires:
piLg
[
Y− 1
α
δ1Y+ c
]
< (1− piLg )
[ρ
α
δ1δ2Y− c
]
⇔ (1− piLg )
ρ
α
δ1δ2Y > piLg
[
Y− 1
α
δ1Y
]
+ c ⇔ δ2 > δ2,K.
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Similarly, the reversed inequality (A.2) with piKc|o = 0 requires that: δ2 > δ2,L.
In the third pure strategy equilibrium, group K fights, while group L cooperates:
piKc|o = 0 and pi
L
c|o = 1. It is easy to verify that this requires δ1 > δ1,K and δ2 ≤ δ2,L.
The final equilibrium in pure strategies is the one in which group K cooperates and
group L fights. This happens if and only if δ2 ≤ δ2,K and δ1 > δ1,L.
(b) The expected utility of player K when his strategy is pKc|o is:
E (u) = pKc|o
[
piLg + (1− piLg )piLc|o
]
Y
+
(
1− pKc|o
) [
piLg + (1− piLg )piLc|o
] [1
α
δ1Y− c
]
+
(
1− pKc|o
)
(1− piLg )(1− piLc|o)
[ρ
α
δ1δ2Y− c
]
.
Mixed strategy equilibria are interior solutions. Therefore, they satisfy the first
order condition: ∂E (u) /∂pKc|o = 0⇔[
piLg + (1− piLg )piLc|o
] [
Y− 1
α
δ1Y+ c
]
− (1− piLg )(1− piLc|o)
[ρ
α
δ1δ2Y− c
]
= 0.
This yields:
piLc|o(1− piLg ) [α− δ1 + ρδ1δ2] =
(
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
)
− piLg [α− δ1 + ρδ1δ2] . (A.3)
Equating piLc|o to p
L
c|o and solving expression (A.3) yields the expression for p
L
c|o
given in the theorem. It can be verified that for the probability pLc|o to lie between
zero and one, either δ1 > δ1,K and δ2 < δ2,K or δ1 < δ1,K and δ2 > δ2,K must hold.
The result for pKc|o can be obtained analogously. A similar reasoning then shows
that 0 < pKc|o < 1 holds if either δ1 > δ1,L and δ2 < δ2,L, or δ1 < δ1,L and δ2 > δ2,L
hold.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 5
From Theorem 1 (b), mixed strategy equilibria can, in principle, arise in three cases.
First, in areas where 1 (ii) and 2 (ii) hold true. In that case the necessary and sufficient
conditions of the same theorem, part (a) for pure strategy equilibria of type (C,C) and
(F, F) are satisfied. Second, in areas where 1 (i) and 2 (i) hold true, the conditions for
pure strategy equilibria of type (F,C) and (C, F) are met. Third, in areas where 1 (i) and
2 (ii) hold true, none of the conditions for pure strategy equilibria are met. This is the
mixed strategy equilibrium of type (c). Note that we can drop the case where conditions
1 (ii) and 2 (i) are satisfied simultaneously. Condition 1 (ii) requires that δ1 < α (1+ c/Y)
while condition 2 (i) requires that δ1 > (1− α) (1+ c/Y). Since α ≤ 1− α, these two
conditions are irreconcilable.
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 6(a)
The probability of group L to be cooperative: pLc|o.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium of type (a) we have:
δ1 < δ1,K ⇒ A ≡ −[α− δ1 + α cY ] < 0 (A1)
δ2 > δ2,K ⇒ −piLg [α− δ1] > −ρδ1δ2(1− piLg ) + α
c
Y
(A2)
From (A1), α cY > −[α− δ1] such that it follows from (A2) that
B ≡ (1− piLg )
[
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
]
(A3)
Equation (3.1) in the main text can then be rewritten as
B(1− pLc|o) + A
[
piLg + (1− piLg )pLc|o
]
= 0. (A.4)
An increase in ρ (or δ2) makes (B) more positive, so that (A.4) can only hold true if pLc|o
increases. An increase in δ1 makes (B) more positive and (A) less negative so that pLc|o
has to increase. It is easy to verify that in the mixed strategy equilibria of type (b) and
(c), where δ1 > δ1,K and δ2 < δ2,K and, therefore, the inequalities (A1) and (A3) are
reversed, opposite changes in pLc|o will occur.
The probability of group K to be cooperative: pKc|o.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium of type (a) we have:
δ1 < δ1,L ⇒ C ≡ −[(1− α)− δ1 + (1− α) cY ] < 0 (A4)
δ2 > δ2,L ⇒ −piKg [(1− α)− δ1] > −(1− ρ)δ1δ2(1− piKg ) + (1− α)
c
Y
(A5)
From (A4), (1− α) cY > −[(1− α)− δ1] so that it follows from (A5) that
D ≡ (1− piKg )
[
(1− ρ)δ1δ2 − (1− α) cY
]
(A6)
The equivalent of Equation (3.1) in the main text can then be rewritten as
C(1− pKc|o) + D
[
piKg + (1− piKg )pKc|o
]
= 0. (A.5)
An increase in ρ (or a decrease in δ2) makes (D) less positive, so that (A.5) can only hold
true if pKc|o decreases. An increase in δ1 makes (D) more positive and (C) less negative
such that pLc|o has to increase. It is easy to verify that in the mixed strategy equilibria of
type (b) and (c), where δ1 > δ1,L and δ2 < δ2,L and, therefore, the inequalities (A4) and
(A6) are reversed, opposite changes in pKc|o will occur.
86 Appendix of Chapter 3
A.4 Proof of Corollary 6(b)
The proof follows directly from the expressions for pLc|o and p
K
c|o given in Theorem 1.
An increase in piLg , group K’s belief that group L is cooperative:
∂pLc|o
∂piLg
=
1
(1− piLg )2
[
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
ρδ1δ2 − δ1 + α − 1
]
. (A.6)
Recall that 0 < pLc|o < 1, i.e.:
0 <
1
(1− piLg )
[
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
α− δ1 + ρδ1δ2 − pi
L
g
]
< 1
⇔ 0 < ρδ1δ2 − α
c
Y
α− δ1 + ρδ1δ2 − pi
L
g < 1− piLg
⇔ piLg <
ρδ1δ2 − α cY
α− δ1 + ρδ1δ2 < 1 (A.7)
From inequality A.7 we know that the term between brackets in Equation (A.6) is nega-
tive. Therefore we know that an increase in group K’s belief that group L is cooperative
decreases group K’s probability to cooperate:
∂pLc|o
∂piLg
< 0.
An increase in piKg , group L’s belief that group K is cooperative:
∂pKc|o
∂piKg
=
1
(1− piKg )2
[
(1− ρ)δ1δ2 − (1− α) cY
1− ρ)δ1δ2 − δ1 + (1− α) − 1
]
. (A.8)
Recall that 0 < pKc|o < 1, i.e.:
0 <
1
(1− piKg )
[
(1− ρ)δ1δ2 − (1− α) cY
(1− α)− δ1 + (1− ρ)δ1δ2 − pi
K
g
]
< 1
⇔ 0 < (1− ρ)δ1δ2 − (1− α)
c
Y
(1− α)− δ1 + (1− ρ)δ1δ2 − pi
K
g < 1− piKg
⇔ piKg <
(1− ρ)δ1δ2 − (1− α) cY
(1− α)− δ1 + (1− ρ)δ1δ2 < 1 (A.9)
From inequality A.9 we know that the term between brackets in Equation (A.8) is nega-
tive. Therefore we know that an increase in group L’s belief that group K is cooperative
decreases group L’s probability to cooperate:
∂pKc|o
∂piKg
< 0.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
The partial derivative of δ2,K with respect to piLg can be shown to be positive for δ1 <
α
(
1+ cY
)
, which is the δ1–coordinate of δ∗K. Hence, an increase in pi
L
g rotates the δ2,K–
curve clockwise through the point δ∗K. Similarly, the partial derivative of δ2,L with respect
to piKg is positive only when δ1 < (1− α)
(
1+ cY
)
, the δ1–coordinate of δ∗L.
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The partial derivative of δ2,K with respect to ρ can be shown to be negative for δ1 <
α
(
1+ 1
piLg
c
Y
)
, which is the δ1–coordinate of the point where the δ2,K–curve cuts the δ1–
axis. Hence an increase in ρ rotates the δ2,K–curve counterclockwise through the point
where the δ2,K–curve cuts the δ1–axis. In contrast, the partial derivative of δ2,L with
respect to ρ is positive when δ1 < (1 − α)
(
1+ 1
piKg
c
Y
)
, the δ1–coordinate of the point
where the δ2,L–curve cuts the δ1–axis, implying that an increase in ρ rotates the δ2,L–
curve clockwise through the point where the δ2,L–curve cuts the δ1–axis.
Obviously, since ρ has no impact on the δ1,H–curves, while shifting δ2,K down and δ2,L
up, the respective δ∗ will shift vertically in the direction stated in the lemma.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 7
In order to rule out the fighting equilibrium, we need that:
δ2 ≤ −
piLg
(1− piLg )ρ
+
α
(1− piLg )ρδ1
[
piLg +
c
Y
]
, (A.10a)
or δ2 ≤ −
piKg
(1− piKg )(1− ρ)
+
(1− α)
(1− piKg )(1− ρ)δ1
[
piKg +
c
Y
]
. (A.10b)
Rearranging terms leads to the following conditions on the costs of fighting:
c
Y
≥ δ1 − α
α
piLg +
ρδ1δ2
α
(1− piLg ), (A.11a)
or
c
Y
≥ δ1 − (1− α)
1− α pi
K
g +
(1− ρ)δ1δ2
1− α (1− pi
K
g ). (A.11b)
(a) The right-hand side of (A.11a) or (A.11b) is increasing in δ1. Ultimately, δ1 can be
reduced to 0, which makes the conditions:
c
Y
≥ −piLg ,
or
c
Y
≥ −piKg .
These conditions are always met.
(b) The right-hand side of (A.11a) or (A.11b) is increasing in δ2. Ultimately, δ2 can be
reduced to 0, which makes the conditions:
c
Y
≥ δ1 − α
α
piLg ,
or
c
Y
≥ δ1 − (1− α)
1− α pi
K
g .
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(c) The right-hand side of (A.11a) is increasing in ρ. Ultimately, ρ can be reduced to 0,
which makes the condition:
c
Y
≥ δ1 − α
α
piLg .
The right-hand side of (A.11b) is decreasing in ρ. Ultimately, ρ can be increased to
1, which makes the condition:
c
Y
≥ δ1 − (1− α)
1− α pi
K
g .
(d) Trust can be manipulated in four ways.
· piLg
if δ1−αα >
ρδ1δ2
α > 0, the right-hand side of (A.11a) is increasing in pi
L
g . So,
decreasing piLg to 0 is effective if:
c
Y
≥ ρδ1δ2
α
.
if δ1−αα <
ρδ1δ2
α , the right-hand side of (A.11a) is decreasing in pi
L
g . So,
increasing piLg to 1 is effective if:
c
Y
≥ δ1 − α
α
.
· piKg
if δ1−(1−α)1−α >
(1−ρ)δ1δ2
1−α > 0, the right-hand side of (A.11b) is increasing in
piKg . So, decreasing piKg to 0 is effective if:
c
Y
≥ (1− ρ)δ1δ2
1− α .
if δ1−(1−α)1−α <
(1−ρ)δ1δ2
1−α , the right-hand side of (A.11b) is decreasing in pi
K
g .
So, increasing piKg to 1 is effective if:
c
Y
≥ δ1 − (1− α)
1− α .
A.7 Proof of Corollary 8
In order to rule out the fighting equilibrium without information about δ1, δ2, ρ,piLg and
piKg , the restrictions on the costs of fighting should hold for all the possible values of these
parameters. Therefore, the conditions should hold for the values of δ1, δ2, ρ,piLg and piKg
that generate the strongest conditions.
We therefore substitute the parameters by their value for which the conditions we
derived in the proof of Corollary 7 are the strongest:
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(a) The right-hand side is decreasing in piLg and piKg respectively, so ultimately piLg and
piKg can be 0:
c
Y
≥ 0,
or
c
Y
≥ 0.
These conditions are always met.
(b) The right-hand side is increasing in δ1 and in piLg and piKg respectively, which can
ultimately increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1− α
α
,
or
c
Y
≥ 1− (1− α)
1− α ⇔
c
Y
≥ α
1− α .
(c) The right-hand side is increasing in δ1 and piLg , which can ultimately increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1− α
α
.
The right-hand side is increasing in δ1 and piKg , which can ultimately increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1− (1− α)
1− α ⇔
c
Y
≥ α
1− α .
(d) Trust can be manipulated in four ways.
· piLg
if δ1−αα >
ρδ1δ2
α > 0, the right-hand side is increasing in ρ, δ1 and δ2, which
can ultimately increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1
α
.
if δ1−αα <
ρδ1δ2
α , the right-hand side is increasing in δ1, which can ultimately
increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1− α
α
.
Where the second restriction is obviously weaker.
· piKg
if δ1−(1−α)1−α >
(1−ρ)δ1δ2
1−α > 0, the right-hand side is decreasing in ρ, which
can ultimately decrease to 0, and increasing in δ1 and δ2, which can ulti-
mately increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1
1− α .
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if δ1−(1−α)1−α <
(1−ρ)δ1δ2
1−α , the right-hand side is increasing in δ1, which can
ultimately increase to 1:
c
Y
≥ 1− (1− α)
1− α ⇔
c
Y
≥ α
1− α .
Where the second restriction is obviously weaker.
A.8 Proof of Corollary 9
Policy Implication 4 states that only a strong boycott can impose the (C,C) equilibrium as
the only equilibrium in pure strategies. The combination of these results with Corollary
7 allows us to derive a ranking of the intervention tools.
− From Policy Implication 2 and Corollary 7 we know that a strong boycott can al-
ways ensure that (C,C) is a BN equilibrium, and (F, F) is not.
− From policy implications 2 and 3 and Corollary 7 we know that a weak boycott and
power politics can not ensure that (C,C) is a BN equilibrium but can rule out the
(F, F) equilibrium for all parameter values in S if: cY ≥ min
{
piLg
[ 1−α
α
]
,piKg
[
α
1−α
]}
.
− The discussion in Corollary 7 shows that in order to rule out the fighting equilib-
rium, both the strong and the weak boycott need to be strengthened: both δ1 and
δ2 need to be decreased. The required direction of change in relative power and
trust, on the other hand, will depend on the other parameter values: in some areas
an increase of ρ or piHg is required, while in other areas ρ or piHg need to be reduced.
BAPPENDIX OF CHAPTER 4
B.1 pi∗i is decreasing in n
Differentiate equation (4.16) w.r.t. n:
dpi∗i
dn
=
∂pi∗i
∂n
+
∂pi∗i
∂w∗
dw∗
dn
.
Denote the rhs of equation (4.15) by A, and differentiate this equation w.r.t. n:
0 =
∂A
∂w∗
dw∗
dn
+
∂A
∂n
.
After substitution, we have that:
dpi∗i
dn
=
∂pi∗i
∂n
+
∂pi∗i
∂w∗
−∂A
∂n
∂A
∂w∗
.
Straightforward computation shows that his expression is negative for n ≥ 1.
B.2 pi∗i (2) is increasing in pm
Differentiate equation (4.18) with respect to pm:
dpi∗i (2)
dpm
=
∂pi∗i (2)
∂pm
+
∂pi∗i (2)
∂w∗
dw∗
dpm
.
Denote the rhs of equation (4.19) by A, and differentiate this equation w.r.t. pm:
0 =
∂A
∂w∗
dw∗
dpm
+
∂A
∂pm
.
After substitution, we have that:
dpi∗i (2)
dpm
=
∂pi∗i (2)
∂pm
+
∂pi∗i (2)
∂w∗
− ∂A
∂pm
∂A
∂w∗
.
Straightforward computation shows that this expression is positive.
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B.3 pi∗i (2) is decreasing in pa
Differentiate equation (4.18) with respect to pa:
dpi∗i (2)
dpa
=
∂pi∗i (2)
∂w∗
dw∗
dpa
.
Denote the rhs of equation (4.19) by A, and differentiate this equation w.r.t. pa:
0 =
∂A
∂w∗
dw∗
dpa
+
∂A
∂pa
.
After substitution, we have that:
dpi∗i (2)
dpa
=
∂pi∗i (2)
∂w∗
− ∂A
∂pa
∂A
∂w∗
.
Straightforward computation shows that this expression is negative.
